An empirical analysis of alternative portfolio insurance strategies in international asset management. by Yau, Jot Kai Hong
University of Massachusetts Amherst 
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst 
Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 
1-1-1988 
An empirical analysis of alternative portfolio insurance strategies 
in international asset management. 
Jot Kai Hong Yau 
University of Massachusetts Amherst 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1 
Recommended Citation 
Yau, Jot Kai Hong, "An empirical analysis of alternative portfolio insurance strategies in international 
asset management." (1988). Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014. 6065. 
https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1/6065 
This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 by an authorized administrator of 
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact scholarworks@library.umass.edu. 
312Dbb0132^b42b 
AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF 
ALTERNATIVE PORTFOLIO INSURANCE STRATEGIES IN 
INTERNATIONAL ASSET MANAGEMENT 
A Dissertation Presented 
by 
JOT KAI HONG YAU 
Submitted to the Graduate School of the 
University of Massachusetts in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree of 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
September 1988 
School of Management 
(c) Copyright by Jot Kai Hong Yau 1988 
All Rights Reserved 
AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF 
ALTERNATIVE PORTFOLIO INSURANCE STRATEGIES IN 
INTERNATIONAL ASSET MANAGEMENT 
A Dissertation Presented 
by 
JOT KAI HONG YAU 
Approved as to style and content by: 
D. Anthony^Butterfie 
School of Management 
, Ph.D. Program Director 
To My Parents, Brothers and Sisters 
IV 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
I would like to express my gratitude to the following 
persons who have helped me in different ways at various 
stages of this endeavor. To my parents, brothers and 
sisters who were willing to give me any support, moral or 
financial, when I needed it most. In particular, my 
brother Steven Kai Cheung, who was instrumental in getting 
all the data on the Hang Seng Index, has been guiding me 
along the way since I was in high school. 
To my friends in the School of Management: Howard Tu who 
had provided me with all the logistical support at any hour 
of the day; Uttama Savanayana who had been my late-night 
companion at the SOM for countless nights, tennis partner 
and beef-noodles partner for many weekends; Joong-Soo Nam 
whose cheerful spirit is always contagious to me; Timothy 
Dwight who read through the entire manuscript. 
To my dissertation committee members: Frederick 
Phillips-Patrick, whose skeptical but scholarly comments 
are always inspirational; Joanne Hill who had accommodated 
me in her own office for two months at Kidder, Peabody, 
provided me with an environment where I had learned a lot 
about portfolio insurance in the real world, and her 
invaluable expert opinions on the subject; and Cleve Willis 
whose scholarly comments and his flexibility has enabled me 
to complete this research on schedule. 
v 
I would also like to thank Matthew Celebuski, formerly 
of Kidder, Peabody for his programming expertise and his 
valuable discussions with me. 
Last, but not least, I wish to devote special thanks and 
my deepest appreciation to my friend, my teacher and my 
dissertation chairperson, Thomas Schneeweis for all the 
things that he has done for me in the past four years; from 
teaching me everything that I know in Finance to driving a 
stick-shift car, to handling life in general. Without his 
continuous support, I would not be able to learn and to 
achieve so much in the past few years. Without his 
consistent guidance, I would have strayed into another 
galaxy and got lost. Without his scholarly and 
professional advice, I would not be able to make this 
dissertation a reality. I will cherish fondly the time we 
spent together in Amherst. 
vi 
ABSTRACT 
AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF 
ALTERNATIVE PORTFOLIO INSURANCE STRATEGIES IN 
INTERNATIONAL ASSET MANAGEMENT 
SEPTEMBER 1988 
JOT KAI HONG YAU, B.Soc.Sc., UNIVERSITY OF HONG KONG 
M.B.A., THE UNIVERSITY OF TOLEDO 
Ph. D . , UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS 
Directed by: Professor Thomas Schneeweis 
Portfolio Insurance is the name given to a wide variety 
of asset allocation strategies used to control investment 
risk in portfolios of various asset classes. Portfolio 
insurance provides downside protection without limiting the 
potential for upside gains. The success of domestic 
portfolio insurance strategies, however, may not indicate 
its benefits in international asset management. Foreign 
financial markets have different market structures which 
may not be suitable for the implementation of portfolio 
insurance strategies. This study, therefore, has attempted 
to establish the facts about the market structures, to 
discover the differences among the markets, and to analyze 
the effects of different market structures on the 
implementation and the costs of portfolio insurance. 
Market volatility and futures mispricing that crucially 
affect the implementation and performance of the 
international portfolio insurance programs are examined. 
The costs of two option based portfolio insurance 
Vll 
strategies (put-protected and dynamic hedging) as well as a 
non-option based strategy (Constant Proportion Portfolio 
Insurance) have been assessed and analyzed under historical 
and simulated market conditions. The impact of the 
strategic decisions (e.g., the protection horizon, the 
floor return, and the rebalance interval) on the costs of 
alternative strategies is also analyzed. 
The empirical results show that although the Japanese 
and Hong Kong markets have been more volatile than the 
U.S., and the futures mispricing more persistent, the costs 
of alternative portfolio insurance strategies were not 
prohibitive for the periods tested. Generally, the cost of 
the 3-year program was less than that of the 1-year 
program. Moreover, for the long-run simulations, the 
Constant Proportion Portfolio Insurance strategy 
outperformed the market for the periods examined. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Portfolio insurance is the name given to a wide variety 
of asset allocation strategies used to control investment 
risk in portfolios of various asset classes.1 Con¬ 
ceptually, an insured portfolio is equivalent to a 
securities' position comprised of an underlying portfolio 
plus a European payout-protected put written on the 
underlying portfolio that guarantees the portfolio against 
loss through a specified date. Since the desired options 
(puts or calls) are usually not available in the active 
options market, portfolio insurance is obtained through 
other techniques which produce an equivalent insured 
position.^ For instance, portfolio insurance can be 
obtained through a dynamic hedging strategy.^ 
Portfolio insurance strategies are different from 
conventional hedging or immunization strategies whose 
objective is to lock-in the current or specified rate of 
return of the portfolio, regardless of the values of the 
underlying assets during the interim period. Conventional 
hedging and immunization strategies are two-sided risk 
control techniques which truncate both the downside risk as 
well as upward gain potentials. In contrast, a portfolio 
insurance strategy provides downside protection without 
limiting the potential for upside gains. The return 
1 
distribution of an uninsured portfolio is symmetric, 
whereas the return distribution from portfolio insurance 
strategy is skewed. Furthermore, the payoff function of a 
portfolio insurance strategy is convex, while the payoff 
function for a perfect hedging or immunization strategy is 
flat. 
About $90 billion in U.S. tax-exempt assets was 
estimated to come under some form of portfolio insurance as 
of June, 1987. This represented an increase of $85 billion 
from 1984.4 Likewise, interest in portfolio insurance has 
been growing in the management of international investments 
[35, 98, 102]. Several factors have contributed to the 
increased interest in the use of portfolio insurance for 
international asset management. First, the success of 
portfolio insurance in the U.S. has been the major force 
driving the development of international portfolio 
insurance. A second contributing force has been the 
continued growth in international investment. U.S. pension 
funds, for example, are expected to have $140 billion in 
international markets by 1990, a huge increase from today's 
total of $32 billion.5 
Although the foreign markets have outperformed the U.S. 
for the past few years, the high volatility of the foreign 
asset and currency markets have been the major concern of 
international investing. Portfolio insurance shows promise 
of being able to reduce the volatility. For investors and 
2 
funds that have already used portfolio insurance 
domestically, insuring their growing international holdings 
is a small additional step. 
However, applying U.S. based portfolio insurance 
programs to international investments raises some important 
concerns. First, as within the U.S., the success of a 
portfolio insurance program depends very much on the proper 
execution and monitoring of the program, and the efficiency 
of the markets. 
Second, the liquidity of the spot and futures markets 
determines the feasibility of dynamic strategies and of the 
use of futures as a replicating instrument. For instance, 
dynamic portfolio insurance strategies do not work very 
well in turbulent markets. In turbulent markets the 
extreme misalignment of the spot and futures markets makes 
it difficult to rebalance a portfolio in order to track the 
put-protected portfolio as required by the portfolio 
insurance program.^ The tracking slippage, due to widening 
basis between the spot and futures contract increases, 
higher than expected, the costs of the dynamic portfolio 
insurance strategies. In foreign countries, excessive 
volatility which causes higher expected insurance costs, 
has been the inhibiting factor for the adoption and growth 
of portfolio insurance. Moreover, implementing a portfolio 
insurance strategy requires accurate estimates of the 
3 
market volatility and instantaneous rates of return on 
various asset classes. 
Third, the economic and institutional differences may 
affect the pricing relationships among various assets and 
the applicability of the models and strategies. Thus, 
portfolio insurance strategies based on the characteristics 
of the U.S. markets and designed for the U.S. users may 
require substantial revisions for them to work efficiently 
and effectively in other markets. 
The purpose of this study is to present specific 
problems in the implementation of alternative portfolio 
insurance strategies. These strategies are then examined 
and empirically presented in an international context. The 
results of this study will offer evidence of the usefulness 
and suitability of portfolio insurance strategies in the 
foreign countries studied. 
1.1 Background 
Since its inception, the concept of portfolio insurance 
has been applied to different contexts. In 1979, Brennen 
and Schwartz [23] presented the dynamic investment 
strategies for conventional life insurance companies which 
issued portfolio insurance in the form of a simple 
guarantee with, or without an accompanying investment in 
the underlying portfolio. In 1980, Gatto et al. [54] 
looked at portfolio insurance provided by the mutual funds. 
By 1984 the increase in the liquidity of the S&P 500 index 
4 
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several risky securities instead of just one. It has 
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87 (Bookstaber and Geld [15], Kritzman ]74], Leibowitz 
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insurance strategies cost too much to provide such kind of 
protection. Previous theoretical studies on portfolio 
insurance have focused on the optimality of the strategy 
(Benninga and Blume [5], Brennen and Schwartz [22, 23, 24], 
3 
Brennen and Solanki [25], Leland [78, 79], and Perold 
[92] ) , and the fundamental or economic costs of portfolio 
insurance (Clarke and Arnott [29] , Garcia and Gould [52] , 
Rendleman and McEnally [100], and Singleton and Grieves 
[115]) . 
Empirical studies have focused on the use and costs of 
the option replication techniques (Bookstaber and Langsam 
[16, 17], Brennen and Schwartz [24], Ferguson [42, 43], 
Frydman and Hill [49], Hanson [58], Platt and Latainer 
[95], Tilley and Latainer [121]). Other empirical studies 
have tested the impacts of the transaction costs, rebalance 
interval, market volatility and their interactions (Asay 
and Edelsburg [4], Etzioni [38], Hill et al. [61], Kritzman 
[74], Leland [77]), and mispricing of futures contracts 
(Hill et al. [61]) on the costs of implementing the dynamic 
hedging strategy. However, these empirical tests have only 
been done in a domestic portfolio insurance framework. The 
usefulness and the costs of alternative portfolio insurance 
strategies in international asset management have not been 
tested or examined. 
1.2 Motivation and Scope of Study 
Since different investors have different utility 
preferences, in order to evaluate the optimality of a 
portfolio insurance strategy we need to know, inter alia, 
the utility function and the risk tolerance function of the 
investor. In addition, an optimization decision rule is 
6 
required. Unfortunately, we lack the details about the 
investor's utility function and preferences, as well as an 
optimizer which can handle option portfolios. For these 
reasons, it is not our intention to examine whether the 
investment results of alternative portfolio insurance 
strategies are optimal or not as compared to those of other 
investment strategies for a particular class of investors. 
Moreover, different market structures may affect the 
implementation of the dynamic portfolio insurance 
strategies, and thus, their costs. Therefore, our broad 
objective in this study is to establish the facts about the 
structures of the foreign markets, to discover the 
differences between the markets, and to analyze their 
effects on the implementation and the costs of dynamic 
portfolio insurance strategies in an international context. 
In this study we limit ourselves to those markets, 
specifically Japan and Hong Kong which have suitable market 
structures to permit dynamic portfolio insurance 
strategies. 
We first examine some of the issues (e.g., volatility 
and mispricing of futures) related to the specific markets 
that crucially affect the implementation and performance of 
the international portfolio insurance programs. Since an 
investor with two equal (risk/return) investments should 
take the cheaper of the investments, before purchasing 
portfolio insurance, the investor should consider the cost 
7 
of protection — the cost the market extracts for bearing 
portfolio insurance risk. Therefore, we also examine the 
costs of portfolio insurance which will affect the 
optimality of the strategy, and the decision to adopt the 
strategy to all prospective buyers and sellers of portfolio 
insurance in international markets. We assess the costs of 
alternative portfolio insurance strategies in the countries 
studied for U.S. investors as well as for nationals of the 
studied foreign countries. Furthermore, in practice, 
transaction costs preclude continuous adjustment of the 
amount invested in the reference portfolio as required by 
the dynamic portfolio insurance strategies.^ it is, 
therefore, "of interest to inquire whether this strategy 
has any practical utility, in view both of the 
impossibility of effecting continuous portfolio adjustment 
and the costs which must be incurred in making discrete 
portfolio adjustments" (Brennen and Schwartz [23, p.64]). 
Thus, this study examines both economic and implementation 
costs of portfolio insurance. 
Specifically, we assess the costs of two option based 
strategies (put-protected and dynamic hedging) as well as a 
non-option based strategy (Constant Proportion Portfolio 
Insurance) in international portfolio insurance programs 
under historical and simulated market conditions. Also, we 
analyze the impact of the strategic decisions (e.g., the 
protection horizon, the floor return, and the rebalance 
8 
interval) on the costs of alternative international 
portfolio insurance strategies given the market conditions. 
The remainder of this dissertation is organised as 
follows. In Chapter 2, we discuss and review the concepts, 
the usefulness and the costs of portfolio insurance 
strategies, and related literature. In Chapter 3, we 
present the alternative portfolio insurance strategies and 
discuss implementation and its problems. Research design 
and methodology are presented and discussed in Chapter 4. 
The empirical results are presented in Chapter 5. 
Conclusions are given in Chapter 6 with suggestions for 
future research. 
9 
CHAPTER 2 
CONCEPTS OF PORTFOLIO INSURANCE STRATEGIES 
AND 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Alteration of Return Distribution and the Pavoff 
Function 
The purpose of portfolio insurance is to guarantee a 
specified minimum rate of return on a portfolio (or a floor 
on the portfolio value) without sacrificing the opportunity 
for future gains over a specified period of time. 
Portfolio insurance strategies include a wide variety of 
dynamic asset allocation strategies which seek to alter the 
return distribution of the portfolio by truncating the 
left-hand tail of the symmetric return distribution or 
adding positive skewness to the return distribution, where 
adding positive skewness is defined as reducing the 
probability of returns below a minimum return level 
relative to the return probabilities associated with an 
uninsured position.1® That is, within a specified 
protection horizon investors are able to remold the return 
distribution in accordance with their utility preferences 
by following the portfolio insurance strategies. Figure 1 
(p. 11) shows the effect of portfolio insurance on the 
return distribution of the underlying assets. How much 
insurance the investors need depends on a number of 
10 
Probability 
Figure 1 Return Distributions of Insured 
and Uninsured Portfolios. 
11 
factors, such as their risk tolerance function, their 
protection horizon, the amount of the deductible, and the 
costs of portfolio insurance. 
Previous research (Arditti and John [2], Bookstaber [9], 
Bookstaber and Clarke [11, 12, 14], Breeden and 
Litzenberger [21], Brennen and Schwartz [23], Leland [79], 
Merton, Scholes, and Gladstein [87, 88], Ross [105]) has 
shown that by buying or selling options at the appropriate 
strike price with the same maturity as the reference 
portfolio, investors are able to achieve any desired 
pattern of returns conditional on the terminal value of the 
reference asset. As shown in Figure 2 (p. 13), on the 
maturity date the payoff function of an insured portfolio 
is same as the one for a portfolio with a protective put 
option written on it with a strike price adequate to 
achieve the desired floor, i.e., the payoff for an insured 
portfolio is the greater of either the difference of the 
value of the underlying asset and the strike price or the 
floor. 
2.2 Optimality. Buyers/Sellers and Performance of Portfolio 
Insurance 
Much of the skepticism about portfolio insurance is 
based on the economic rationality assumption of human 
behavior that investors optimize their objective function 
(be it terminal expected utility or terminal wealth or 
another objective) given their risk tolerance function and 
12 
Payoff 
Strike Value of Underlying Asset 
Price Prior to Expiration 
Figure 2 Payoff for the Insured Portfolio. 
13 
costs.11 Critics argue that portfolio insurance is not the 
optimal investment strategies for "most investors", given 
their assumptions. For instance, Brennen and Solanki [25] 
have proven that portfolio insurance (buying a put) is not 
the optimal investment strategy if the investor is 
maximizing expected utility of the terminal wealth in a 
two-date framework in a Black-Scholes world. They suggest 
that general insurance policies which provide strictly 
convex payoff functions are more appropriate kinds of 
contracts than portfolio insurance unless the utility 
function of the investor is linear below the insurance 
level and the stock purchased has a zero risk premium. 
Benninga and Blume [5] have examined the conditions 
under which an investor would utilize portfolio insurance 
as part of an overall strategy. They have shown that (1) in 
complete markets, only those investors whose utility 
functions display non-constant coefficients of relative 
risk aversion would find it optimal to insure their 
portfolios.1^ It is highly unlikely that investors with 
constant relative risk aversion (i.e., the average investor 
in Leland's terminology) would insure a portfolio; (2) if 
there is noncontinuous trading and the investor utility 
function displays constant proportional risk-aversion, the 
investor would buy a riskless asset directly when it is 
available but not insure his/her portfolio; and (3) only 
under the most incomplete markets (i.e., noncontinuous 
14 
trading, and unavailability of riskless assets) would an 
investor find an insurance strategy optimal. Their view is 
consistent with the perfect markets framework developed in 
the finance literature (e.g., Fama and Miller [42]) that 
there is no specific demand for insurance even though risk 
aversion on the part of consumers is explicitly assumed and 
future consumption opportunities are uncertain. 
While Brennen and Solanki and Benninga and Blume have 
analyzed the type of insurance contracts and the market 
conditions that are optimal for portfolio insurance, Leland 
[79] has discussed the kinds of investors who would buy 
portfolio insurance. He asserts that investors (i) whose 
risk tolerance increases with wealth more rapidly than that 
of the average investor, or (ii) whose expectations are 
more optimistic than average, would benefit from portfolio 
insurance. Investors belonging to class (i) would include 
safety-first investors, such as overfunded pension and 
endowment funds. Class (ii) investors would include 
institutions with well-diversified portfolios managed with 
the expectation of above-average returns, or positive 
alpha. He has also proven that for this class of investors 
the dynamic strategies used to create desirable 
nonproportional end-of-period values may enable achievement 
of even higher levels of expected utility than any buy-and- 
hold strategy involving the reference portfolio. Thus, 
whether an investor is a buyer or seller of portfolio 
15 
insurance depends on his/her risk tolerance function 
relative to that of the average investor.13 Sharpe [114] 
has also illustrated how different risk tolerance 
assumptions lead to portfolio insurance type solutions. 
Perold and Sharpe [93] have discussed various dynamic 
strategies including some portfolio insurance strategies in 
terms of the relationships between the payoff function and 
the risk tolerance function to the exposure to risky 
assets. They contend that there is no reason to believe 
that any particular type of dynamic strategies is best for 
everyone. The 'best' strategy should be measured by the 
degree of fit between a strategy's exposure to risky assets 
and the investor's risk tolerance (expressed as a function 
of an appropriate cushion). Rubinstein [107] and Ferguson 
[42] also argue along the same line that there is no single 
optimal strategy for all investors. 
Based on the work by Merton [85, 86], Perold [92] also 
shows that Constant Proportion Portfolio Insurance (CPPI) 
is the optimal strategy for investors who are maximizing 
the utility of lifetime consumption in some cases. For 
those who maximize the end-of-period wealth, i.e., those 
who have decreasing risk aversion relative to their level 
of wealth and have the same protection parameters such as 
the multiple, the floor, and the protection horizon, the 
CPPI strategy is the optimal strategy among all self¬ 
financing dynamic asset allocation strategies.14 
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In addition to the demand for portfolio insurance, 
individual characteristics of investors may lead to 
portfolio insurance selling. Hill and Williams [66] have 
pointed out that the mere presence of decreasing absolute 
risk aversion as a function of wealth is not a sufficient 
condition for buying portfolio insurance, much as risk 
aversion does not mean that all investors hold risk-free 
assets. Investors may buy or sell portfolio insurance 
because they have different preferences for positive 
skewness. Those who have a low preference for skewness 
relative to the average investor would sell portfolio 
insurance. They can improve their return by selling 
skewness or a portfolio of upside returns to those who 
value these features more highly than the price charged in 
the marketplace. However, at the same time, there is a 
tradeoff between skewness and symmetric risk (standard 
deviation). 
Black and Hakanoglu [6] have also discussed why people 
sell portfolio insurance. Those investors who do not need 
a floor on their portfolios are potential portfolio 
insurance sellers -- particularly if they favor stocks with 
low P/E ratios; use dividend discount models; or expect 
volatile, non-trending markets. They may buy after a 
market falls and sell after a market rises in order to 
realize some capital gains.^ - It has to be noted that the 
objective of these investors is not selling portfolio 
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insurance per se, but the effect of their aggregate 
transactions is. 
To date, no single performance measure/optimization 
decision rule for option strategies/option portfolios 
appears acceptable to both academics and professional 
investment managers. The problems in the evaluation of the 
performance of portfolios with options have been widely 
discussed in the finance literature (Bookstaber [9, 10], 
Bookstaber and Clarke [11, 12, 14], Merton et al. [85, 86], 
Ritchken [103]). Alternative approaches have been 
suggested to evaluate option portfolios. For instance, 
Tehranian [120] , Booth et al. [19] , and Brooks et al. [27] 
have used stochastic dominance to evaluate optioned 
portfolios, while Rudd [110] has put forward the risk model 
for option portfolios. Galai and Geske [51] have discussed 
the hedging approach and the decomposition approach to 
option performance measurement. 
Traditionally, performance evaluation is approached as a 
two-dimensional tradeoff between the mean and variance of 
returns. Investors will prefer portfolios with high 
expected return but less variance. If the return 
distribution is normal, a two-dimensional mean-variance 
tradeoff is adequate to evaluate the performance of 
portfolios resulting from differing strategies, since the 
mean and variance completely describe the normal 
distribution. However, portfolios resulting from portfolio 
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insurance strategies cannot be analyzed in the traditional 
risk/return framework since the return distribution can no 
longer be adequately described by the first two statistical 
moments and misleading conclusions could result. 
2.3 Review of Literature: The Usefulness of Portfolio 
Insurance 
The controversial debate does not lie in the fact that 
portfolio insurance is useful in theory, but does lie in 
the fact that we do not have details about the investment 
horizon, the utility function and the risk tolerance 
function of the investor, and the cost of portfolio 
insurance which are essential in determining the 
desirability of portfolio insurance strategies in the 
optimization process. The central question on portfolio 
insurance related therefore to its usefulness in an 
empirical sense. 
The usefulness of portfolio insurance depends on its 
ability to maintain the floor value as at the end of the 
protection horizon while capturing the most of the upside 
gain at the lowest cost. There are several ways to assess 
the usefulness of portfolio insurance. 
First, any form of portfolio insurance should be able to 
insure the floor value at least at the end of the 
protection period, if not for the interim period. 
Violation of the floor value destroys the basic premise of 
portfolio insurance. Second, the usefulness of portfolio 
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insurance also depends on how much upside gain is captured 
by the portfolio insurance strategy and at what cost. 
Critics (e.g., Rendleman and McEnally [100]) of 
portfolio insurance have questioned the usefulness of 
portfolio insurance. They show that alternative investment 
strategies have outperformed portfolio insurance 
strategies. Moreover, some evidence suggests that 
portfolio insurance costs too much in terms of foregone 
returns. However, as mentioned in the previous section 
2.2, we do not have an performance framework which can 
assess the optimal tradeoff between risk and return beyond 
the mean-variance dimension. Whether such protection comes 
at a fair price depends on the risk tolerance function of 
the individual investors (portfolio insurance users). Some 
critics (e.g., Garcia and Gould [52]) even contend that 
portfolio insurance strategies will not outperform a static 
mix portfolio strategy over the long run because of the 
transaction costs. On the other hand, proponents of 
portfolio insurance have also presented evidence favoring 
portfolio insurance strategies. The results of their 
research are presented in this and subsequent sections. 
Earlier studies of portfolio insurance focused on its 
usefulness as against some static strategy — usually, buy- 
and-hold strategies. Hanson [58] ran a simulation on the 
past data of S&P 500 for the period of mid-1970 to end of 
1983 using dividend-adjusted Black/Scholes model to 
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generate 3 month at-the-money European index puts. He 
shows that a S&P 500 index fund protected by three-month 
index put options would have actually outperformed the S&P 
500 by nearly 200 basis points per year on a compound 
annual basis. This has resulted in approximately 25 
percent more wealth at the end of the 13.5 year period. 
Ferguson [43] also shows that a dynamic asset allocation 
strategy using the levered S&P 500 and the one-year 
Treasury bills (a synthetic call) and with a specified 
minimum return of -5 percent per year would have beaten the 
S&P 500 in 58.9 percent of the years from 1928 through 1983 
and achieved a compound annual return of 10.4 percent, 
versus 9.1 percent for the unlevered S&P 500. 
Similar results are obtained in fixed income portfolios. 
Platt and Latainer [95] have shown that the dynamic asset 
allocation strategy would have had outperformed the Lehman 
Government/Corporate Bond Index in eight of eleven 
individual years for the period 1973-1983. Furthermore, 
the dynamic asset allocation strategy outperformed the 
Lehman Index over all but one three-year holding period, 
and over each five-year and ten-year holding period. For 
the full eleven years of Lehman index, the dynamic asset 
allocation strategy produced returns 178 basis points 
higher than the index. Significantly, it also outperformed 
one-year Treasury bills over this period, despite the fact 
that the most active bond managers could not do so. 
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It is important to note that while testing the 
usefulness of alternative portfolio insurance strategies 
with historical data can yield useful insights, the results 
from these studies tend to be highly period-specific. 
Therefore, they may not offer an appropriate guide to the 
costs of portfolio insurance.17 
Furthermore, limited tests have been done on the 
violation of the floor value (return). Although most 
portfolio insurance strategies have a built-in mechanism to 
avoid a decline in the value of portfolio below the floor, 
unexpected jumps in the prices of the assets may lead to a 
lower floor value. An interesting study in this aspect is 
done by Zhu and Kavee [123] in a Monte Carlo simulation 
environment. They have shown that neither the dynamic 
hedging strategy nor the CPPI could insure the value of the 
portfolio from falling below the insured level (the floor). 
2.4 Review of Literature: The Costs of Portfolio Insurance 
The costs of portfolio insurance can be broken down into 
two elements. The first one is the economic cost of 
insurance -- the pure price the marketplace extracts for 
providing the insurance -- for bearing the risk that 
portfolio insurance lays off. This cost can be an upfront 
payment as if exchange-listed protective puts were 
purchased in the marketplace, or one can pay for insurance 
by giving up part of the upside return potential. In the 
upfront payment case, the value of the insured portfolio 
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will be below the floor value by the amount of the option 
premium whereas, in the latter form of payment, the minimum 
value of the insured portfolio is the floor level. The 
second element of portfolio insurance cost is the 
implementation cost which includes the commission, the 
market impact in terms of bid-ask spreads, and futures 
mispricing. 
2.4.1 Economic Costs: Foregone Returns 
Generally, for dynamic portfolio insurance strategies 
the cost of portfolio insurance is the foregone returns on 
the upside. This payment method is called equity sharing. 
It involves no upfront payment, but the reduction in payoff 
on the upside should be approximately equal to the initial 
cost of the put option if it were traded on the market. 
The decision of whether to pay a fixed, upfront cost or to 
use an equity sharing approach depends on (1) the 
investor's perceptions of future market opportunities, (2) 
the need of funds to capture these opportunities as well as 
(3) the expectation of future market volatility. The fixed 
payment is more attractive in periods of high expected 
returns and high anticipated volatility, while the equity 
sharing will be more attractive in periods of low expected 
returns. 
Garcia and Gould [52] have analyzed the cost of 
portfolio insurance in terms of foregone returns. Based on 
the distributions of shortfalls and excesses from the 
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historical one-year simulations run on the S&P 500 with 240 
different starting months from 1963 through 1983 employing 
the dynamic asset allocation strategy, they found that the 
zero floor insured portfolio cost roughly as much on the 
upside (in terms of shortfall) as it saved on the downside 
(in terms of excess return above the market). Furthermore, 
this portfolio was protected against downside moves in the 
market of 20 to 40 percent, while avoiding shortfalls of 20 
percent or more. The -5 percent floor portfolio 
experienced virtually no shortfalls of 10 percent or more. 
They concluded that the value of the studied insurance 
would seem to be its ability to protect the investor 
against dramatic drops in market value. In general, 
however, the evidence does not indicate that a dynamically 
balanced, insured portfolio will over the long run 
outperform a static mix portfolio. They have also shown 
that the lower the portfolio's floor return, the lower the 
long-run cost and lower average shortfall. 
Clarke and Arnott [29] have also studied the cost of 
portfolio insurance in terms of tradeoffs and choices. 
Using the ex ante return distribution framework developed 
by Bookstaber and Clarke [13], they have also shown that 
the economic cost can be controlled and reduced by the 
investor, by (1) lowering the floor return of the insurance 
strategy, (2) decreasing the percentage of the portfolio's 
assets covered by insurance, (3) increasing the risk (beta) 
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of the underlying portfolio, or (4) extending the insurance 
strategy's horizon beyond one year.^ Some factors which 
are beyond the control of the investors, such as a decline 
in the risk-free rate, an increase in the return on the 
underlying assets relative to the risk-free rate, and an 
increase in volatility all lead to higher costs. 
However, in an efficient market, the cost of insurance 
is expected to be priced fairly. Singleton and Grieves 
[115] have shown that synthetic puts can be used to reduce 
risk (standard deviation), but at a fair price in the form 
of lower expected returns. Bookstaber and Langsam [16] 
have pointed out that when the performance of a dynamic 
asset allocation strategy is compared to that of a static 
asset allocation strategy (e.g., the buy-and-hold 
strategy), the dynamic strategy provides better downside 
protection and more upside return potential. They have 
argued that this occurs because the portfolio insurance is 
now being provided in the most efficient manner. Bonds 
simply are not the most efficient way of providing 
protection. An unnecessarily large part of the portfolio 
must be dedicated to the insurance role when bonds are used 
as the insurance vehicle. When dynamic hedging is used to 
provide that protection more efficiently, resources are 
saved that can be redirected toward return objectives. 
While Bookstaber and Langsam [16] point out the problems 
of comparing the costs of a static asset allocation 
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portfolio strategy and those of a dynamic portfolio 
strategy, Rendleman and McEnally [100] have proposed a 
method to evaluate the costs of portfolio insurance and how 
much better one can do without portfolio insurance. Given 
a logarithmic utility function and its optimal strategy 
(logarithmic strategy), they conclude that insuring a 
portfolio is deemed to get a considerable diminution of 
expected logarithmic utility, portfolio returns, and rate 
of capital growth. The effects of the lower rate of a 
capital growth are accentuated when investment returns are 
accumulated over multiple holding periods, with the result 
that the optimal strategy dominates the portfolio insurance 
strategy with a high probability over long investment 
horizons. Insuring a portfolio also results in the 
portfolio achieving only the guaranteed minimum return with 
a very high probability. Rubinstein [107] criticizes their 
study as being too restrictive in assuming that the 
logarithmic utility function is for "most investors." For 
investors who do not have a logarithmic utility function, 
portfolio insurance strategy might be the optimal strategy. 
He further asserts that sometimes a portfolio insurance 
strategy might outperform the logarithmic strategy even for 
those investors with logarithmic utility function. 
While Rendleman and McEnally [100] , Clarke and Arnott 
[29], and Garcia and Gould [52] assess the economic cost of 
portfolio insurance, most of the empirical studies address 
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the second element of portfolio insurance cost. The 
implementation cost arises from frictions, imperfections, 
and market price pressure effects in the financial market 
when dynamic strategies are employed to replicate a put 
option. 
2.4.2 Implementation Costs 
The implementation costs of a portfolio insurance 
program include the transaction costs due to rebalancing, 
the market impact of the program on the prices and in case 
of the futures version of portfolio insurance, the 
mispricing of the futures contracts. The rebalancing 
interval is highly correlated with the volatility of the 
market. As the market has become more volatile, more 
frequent rebalancing is required in order to protect the 
portfolio. Thus high volatility increases the 
implementation costs due to more frequent rebalancing. 
The replication error represents the implicit cost of 
portfolio insurance, whereas the implementation cost is 
explicit cost of portfolio insurance. Reducing the 
explicit costs will increase the implicit cost and vice- 
versa. Etzioni [38] has studied the tradeoff between the 
replication error and the transaction costs. He has 
analyzed the effects of different rebalancing intervals on 
the tradeoff. From the Monte Carlo simulations, he 
concludes that the lag discipline rebalancing, i.e., 
rebalance only when the actual mix lags the required mix by 
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more than a specified amount, yielded the best result in 
terms of the tradeoff between the replication error and the 
implementation cost. 
While Etzioni's approach is heuristic, Leland [77] has 
provided the theoretical justification for considering both 
the transaction cost and rebalance interval simultaneously 
in a replication strategy via an adjustment of the 
volatility estimate. The rationale for adjusting the 
volatility estimate is that each time a transaction occurs, 
the associated trading costs cause the purchase cost to be 
higher and the selling proceeds to be lower than in the 
absence of these costs. 
The transaction cost adjusted volatility is directly 
proportionate to the volatility and the transaction cost, 
and indirectly proportionate to the rebalance interval. 
The adjusted volatility is calculated as: 
<TA2 =<r2[ l +(</TZ7rrU/<jJt)] (2.1) 
where: = the transaction cost adjusted volatility; 
(T = the annualized standard deviation of the 
natural logarithm of price relatives of 
returns; 
k = the round-trip transaction cost as a 
proportion of the transaction size; 
t = the revision interval as a proportion of a 
year. 
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The appeal of this approach is that the hedging strategy 
itself, i.e., the delta of the option, takes into account 
the trading costs. 
Hill et al. [61] have analyzed the issue of the 
magnitude of the impact of adverse volatility changes and 
extreme levels of futures mispricing on the expected level 
and the range of costs associated with portfolio insurance. 
They found that the impact of stock index futures 
mispricing (treated as an increment to trading cost) on 
portfolio insurance costs was relatively small. Its 
magnitude was less than 0.5% for a 3-year program, and 1% 
for a 1-year program. However, the potential impact on an 
option replication strategy of an extreme increase in 
volatility was much larger in magnitude, just under 1% in a 
3-year protection program and over 2% in a 1-year 
protection program for the non-Depression scenario. Also, 
shorter term programs are more affected by volatility. The 
expected median insurance cost can actually double or 
triple under extreme volatility conditions. 
2.4.3 Costs of Alternative Portfolio Insurance Strategies 
The above studies only focused on the cost of a 
particular portfolio insurance strategy. Recently, Frydman 
and Hill [49], and Zhu and Kavee [123] have examined and 
compared the costs of alternative portfolio insurance 
strategies. Frydman and Hill [49] studied the usefulness 
and the costs of dynamic hedging, and Constant Proportion 
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Portfolio Insurance (CPPI) to insure a well-diversified 
portfolio, the Windsor Fund for the period April 1982 - 
December 1986. They conclude that dynamic hedging would 
have been the cheaper alternative compared to the CPPI. 
Zhu and Kavee [123] have evaluated and compared the 
performance of the dynamic asset allocation strategy and 
the CPPI in terms of their effectiveness as "insurance" 
against the costs involved. Their simulation results show 
that both strategies allow the investors to shape their 
return distributions, and provide downside protection but 
at a considerable cost. The major result from their 
simulation, as related to the costs of portfolio insurance 
is that, when the market volatility increases, the dynamic 
asset allocation strategy will incur a higher level of 
transaction costs. In contrast, the CPPI strategy will 
entail a greater economic cost in terms of foregone 
returns. 
2.4.4 Summary 
Portfolio insurance strategy is able to alter the return 
distribution of a portfolio with a price. Although there 
is no available analytical framework to evaluate the 
tradeoff between the expected return and various dimensions 
of risk, the estimation of portfolio insurance costs 
provides an important input into the decision process of 
investment optimization. 
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Past studies have shown that portfolio insurance 
strategies allow participation in an upward market while 
maintaining a floor in a downside market. But, this is 
attainable at a fair price. Should an investor consider 
buying or selling portfolio insurance depends on the risk 
tolerance function and the cost of protection. The costs 
of portfolio insurance include the economic costs, as well 
as, the implementation costs. Different strategies entail 
different ex post costs depending on the volatility of the 
market as well as the realization of the expectations of 
the portfolio insurance users. 
Each of the alternative portfolio insurance strategies 
is affected by the effect of the opportunity cost and its 
implementation. The implementation of principal forms of 
portfolio insurance strategies are discussed in the 
following chapter. 
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CHAPTER 3 
IMPLEMENTATION OF PORTFOLIO INSURANCE STRATEGIES 
3.1 Option Based Portfolio Insurance Strategies 
Generally, portfolio insurance strategies can be 
categorized as option based or non-option based (Table 1, 
p. 33). The practice of option based portfolio insurance is 
based on the option theory. The investor would buy a 
European (payout-protected) put option on the underlying 
portfolio such that if exercising the put was desirable, it 
would yield just enough to make up for any decline in 
portfolio value, plus the initial cost of the option. 
Equivalently, from the put-call parity, buying a fiduciary 
(synthetic) call — buying a call option on the underlying 
portfolio with strike price equal to the initial portfolio 
value, plus holding cash equal to the initial portfolio 
discounted by the riskless interest rate over the insured 
period -- would provide the same kind of payoff pattern 
(insurance) as purchasing a put option would (Brennen and 
Solanki [25], Leland [79]). Thus, perfect portfolio 
insurance can be achieved with a call or a put on the 
portfolio. In Appendix A, the equivalency of a fiduciary 
call and a put option in protecting a portfolio is shown. 
The option replication or option based portfolio 
insurance strategies begin by specifying a protection 
horizon, T and a desired floor value at that horizon, F-p. 
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Table 1 
Classification of Portfolio Insurance Strategies. 
(A) Option Based 
Strategies Financial Instruments Used 
(i) Dynamic Asset Allocation Underlying Assets, 
(Synthetic Put/ 
Fiduciary Call) 
(ii) Dynamic Hedging 
(iii) Protective-Put 
(B) Non-Option Based 
Strategies 
(i) Constant Proportion 
Portfolio Insurance 
(Futures Version) 
T-bills/T-bonds 
Underlying Assets, 
Futures on the Underlying 
Assets 
Underlying Assets, 
Exchange Traded Options on 
Underlying Assets 
Financial Instruments Used 
Underlying Assets, 
T-bills/ T-bonds 
(Underlying Assets and 
Futures on the Underlying 
Assets) 
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There are two ways to set the desired floor protection. 
One is to fix the desired floor at the beginning of the 
protection period in nominal dollar terms, while the other 
is to reset the floor as the market condition changes. By 
resetting the floor, the portfolio is insured at a new 
level of protection. 
Suppose the portfolio to be protected is a stock index 
fund, and the strategy is a self-financing one, i.e., the 
funds used to purchase and exercise the puts/calls come 
from the portfolio itself. And we replicate a fiduciary 
call and set the floor at the beginning at the program. 
The option based portfolio insurance strategy then involves 
investing F0 amount of funds in Treasury bills and 
purchasing n number of call options with strike price, K, 
where n and K are determined jointly by the following 
equations: 
n * K = PV0 - F0 (3.1) 
where o = PV0 * (1+fr) 
fr = the minimum floor return at expiration date 
n = (PV0 - F0)/K 
= number of call options 
and 
where 
K = strike price; 
n K - F^ 
F T = Foe 
(3.2) 
rT 
The amount that is to be invested in Treasury bills, F0 
should grow at a riskless rate that at expiration the 
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amount in Treasury bills will at least be equal to FT, the 
desired protection level. This amount will ensure that 
there will be enough money to exercise the calls at strike 
price K at expiration and thus the portfolio will never 
become levered. 
At any time t before expiration time T, the payoff from 
this strategy is: 
PVt = Ft + (n * Ct) (3.3) 
where the floor is: 
F t = FTe-r . (3.4) 
At expiration the payoff is: 
PVT = Ft + [n * MAX(ST-K,0)]. (3.5) 
The exposure of the portfolio value to risk is: 
Exposure = n * N(hl) (3.6) 
where N(hl) (delta) is obtained from the option pricing 
model (see Appendix A). The payoff of the insured 
portfolio at the end of the protection horizon is: 
PVt - n * [Max (St, Kt)] + n * DtT (3.7) 
or PVt> n * (Kt +DtT) (3.7a) 
where D^T is value at time T of dividend between t and T. 
Since the minimum possible value of the insured 
portfolio at the end of the protection horizon of the 
program is equal to n*(K^+D^T), then sufficient funds 
should be invested in the Treasury bills at the beginning 
of the program growing at such a rate that at the end of 
the protection horizon, there will be enough funds to 
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exercise the puts to achieve the desired floor. By 
investing n*(e-r*(K^+D^T)) amount of dollars in 
Treasury bills and buying n*(Ct(K^)) worth of calls at time 
t, the investor is able to insure his/her portfolio at the 
desire floor at the end of the protection period. Thus, 
the option based portfolio insurance strategies implicitly 
involve a floor value at every time prior to the horizon. 
The floor at any time prior to the end of the protection 
period is the present value of the desired floor, 
discounted at the riskless rate of interest. 
Now, suppose that we replicate the put option instead of 
the call option. At any time t until the end of the 
protection horizon, time T, the value of one unit of the 
the insured portfolio, PV^ is equal to: 
PVt = (St+Pt(Kt)) (3.8) 
where the strike of the put is set at the beginning of the 
program at the level of the desired floor. If the value of 
the risky asset declines below the floor, the gain from the 
puts will make up for the loss in the risky asset position, 
less the cost of the put. From put-call parity, the value 
of a put is: 
Pt = Ke_r(T_t)[N(hl) + SD(T-t)2] - St[N(hl)]. (3.9) 
Substituting this into equation 3.8, we have: 
PVt = St(l-N(hl)) + Ke-r(T_t) [N(hi) + SD(T-t)2] . ( 3 . 10) 
Equation 3.10 provides the basis for option based 
portfolio insurance. Unfortunately, European payout- 
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protected options on portfolios of securities are not 
listed on exchanges in the U.S. or in most foreign 
countries. In theory, portfolio insurance can be done by 
buying a protective put on each security in the portfolio. 
The problems with this approach are that (1) listed puts 
are not available for all securities, and (2) strike prices 
and expiration dates are fixed by the exchanges. More 
importantly, a portfolio of options is not equivalent to an 
option on a portfolio. The risk of a portfolio of 
securities is less than the sum of the individual risks. 
That is, the unsystematic risk will be diversified away and 
what it needs is an option on the portfolio to hedge the 
systematic risk. Hence, it would be unnecessarily 
expensive to buy puts on each security. 
However, synthetic options on portfolios can be created 
by a dynamic asset allocation strategy, employing either 
Treasury bills and the underlying portfolio; or by a 
dynamic hedging strategy using futures. The dynamic 
strategies replicate the payoff that would occur if a put 
option were purchased on the underlying portfolio. A put 
option pays off dollar-for-dollar for any drop in portfolio 
value below its strike price. Creating a put option with a 
strike price equal to its desired floor return, and then 
adding that put option to the portfolio, will provide the 
desired protection. 
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3.1.1 Option Replication Via Dynamic Strategies 
If security returns are lognormally distributed at any 
future time, and continuous trading is possible, Black and 
Scholes [8] and Merton [84] show that the returns to any 
option on an asset can be duplicated by an appropriate 
trading strategy involving the asset and a riskless asset. 
This implies that, in a Black-Scholes world, there exists a 
dynamic investment strategy which can generate insured 
portfolio values (e.g., no options need exist to achieve 
insured values). Cox and Rubinstein [34], Rubinstein and 
Leland [109] , Rubinstein [108] , Brennen and Schwartz [23] , 
Bookstaber [9], Bookstaber and Clarke [12, 14], and Asay 
and Edelburg [4] have all discussed the replication 
strategies using stock, Treasury bills, and futures. 
The process requires maintaining a risky asset-Treasury 
bill balance, such that the value of the replicating 
portfolio has exactly the same sensitivity to changes in 
the value of the underlying risky asset (e.g., stock market 
index, foreign currency) as it would have had it been 
insured with protective European puts. In other words, 
using the option theory, a combination of risky assets and 
Treasury bills (or immunized bond portfolios) is created 
that has the same hedge ratio (also known as the "delta") 
as a put-protected portfolio does.-^ The hedge ratio 
determines the number of units of the underlying portfolio 
to hold. The amount of riskless assets to hold is 
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determined by subtracting the value of the held units of 
the underlying portfolio from the total value of the 
insured portfolio. When the value of the risky assets 
declines by a specified amount, money is taken .out of the 
risky asset and moved into the riskless asset. As value of 
the risky asset increases, more money will be shifted from 
the riskless asset into the risky assets to capture the 
maximum upside exposure. This process as applied to port¬ 
folio insurance is known as dynamic asset allocation. 
The following example illustrates the process. Suppose 
the value of the portfolio to be insured is $107.04. A 
delta of 0.4803 means that the insurance strategy requires 
0.4803 units of the underlying portfolio at $100.00 per 
unit for $48.03, plus the rest of the funds in riskless 
assets. Thus, the funds allocated to the riskless assets 
will be $59.01 ($107.04 - $48.03). If the unit value of 
the underlying asset goes up to $120 from $100, the value 
of the underlying asset held in the replicating portfolio 
will go up to $57.64 (0.4803*$120) and the riskless asset 
to $60.19 ($59.01*1.02). Therefore, the value of the 
insured portfolio will increase to $117.83 ($57.64 + 
$60.19). As this happens, the insurance strategy demands a 
reallocation of funds from the riskless asset to the risky 
asset. The new delta is 0.7277 which is .2474 greater than 
the delta before reallocation. With the new delta, it 
requires purchasing $29.69 of the underlying asset (.2474 
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unit of underlying asset at $120) and selling $29.69 worth 
of riskless assets. The composition of the new replicating 
portfolio comprised of $77.72 worth of risky assets and 
$40.11 worth of riskless assets. If the value of the 
underlying asset drops to $83.33, the new delta of .3266 
calls for a shift of $12.81 from the risky asset to the 
riskless assets. The value of the replicating portfolio 
will fall to $87.41. The new composition will have $27.22 
worth of risky assets and $60.19 worth of riskless assets. 
It is noted that this process is self-financing, i.e., 
there is no addition or withdrawal of funds from the port¬ 
folio. The purchase of units of the underlying portfolio 
can always be made with proceeds from the riskless asset 
sales, and vice-versa. 
The hedge ratio measures the instantaneous change of the 
option premium in response to a change in the underlying 
asset price, i.e., it is the first derivative of the option 
price with respect to the underlying asset price. It is 
the slope of the line AB in Figure 2 (p. 13), which 
represents the value of the option prior to expiration. If 
the delta can be replicated and maintained continuously as 
that for a put option, the exact payoff pattern is 
duplicated for the maturity date. 
One complication of replicating the delta is that it 
changes with the value of the underlying asset as well as 
the time to expiration (Rubinstein and Leland [109]). It 
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is zero when the underlying asset is worthless, and it 
increases as the value of the underlying asset rises. At 
the strike price, the hedge ratio reaches 0.5, and with the 
value of the underlying asset exceeds the strike price, it 
is moving towards one. At expiration, the option is either 
in-the-money or out-of-the-money, and thus the delta will 
either be one or zero.2^ 
The rate of change of the delta in response to a change 
in the value of the underlying asset is measured by the 
gamma of the option. The gamma is the sensitivity of delta 
of an option to changes in the underlying asset price, 
i.e., it is the second derivative of the option price with 
respect to the underlying asset price.21 Theoretically, to 
replicate an option perfectly, both the delta and gamma of 
the replicating strategy have to be adjusted continuously, 
during the protection horizon as the value of the under¬ 
lying asset changes. "Gamma risk" arises from dynamic 
strategies when the gamma is not being replicated at all 
times. 
Another method to create a synthetic put option on a 
securities portfolio is to use futures contracts. Instead 
of moving the funds in and out of the risky assets, futures 
contracts are used to effect changes in the exposure in the 
risky assets. If the underlying portfolio is fully in¬ 
vested in risky assets, a short position will normally be 
taken in futures, dampening the volatility of the overall 
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portfolio. If the value of the portfolio rises, the short 
position is reduced to increase equity exposure, while a 
drop in the value of the portfolio leads to more shorting 
of futures in order to decrease downside loss. 
The amount of futures contracts to be shorted depends on 
the sensitivity of the change in the value of the put 
option to a change in the value of the underlying asset. 
The delta of a put ranges from zero to negative one. If it 
is zero, then no futures are shorted and the whole port¬ 
folio is exposed to risk. As more and more futures are 
shorted, i.e., as the delta gets more and more negative, 
the exposure to risk is reduced. This is, in effect, 
reallocating the funds between the risky asset and the 
riskless asset. A portfolio that consists of a short 
position in futures and a long position in the underlying 
portfolio is identical to a fully invested position in the 
riskless asset when interest rates are non-stochastic. 
Thus, the percentage of the portfolio that is shorted via 
the futures contract represents an asset allocation from 
the risky to the riskless asset. Sometimes, Treasury bill 
or Treasury bond futures can be used in the same way to 
affect the exposure of the cash position.^3 This rep¬ 
lication strategy using futures is known as dynamic 
hedging. 
The often cited (Bookstaber and Langsam [16], Hill et 
al. [61], Tilley and Latainer [121]) advantages of using 
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futures in dynamic strategies include the following: first, 
the frequent adjustments required in dynamic programs can 
be done in futures markets at low trading costs (ignoring 
mispricing) and in markets with the greatest continuous 
liquidity. Second, the liquidity of the futures market 
allows protection programs to be undertaken on a larger 
scale than is feasible in option or spot markets. Third, 
the use of futures permits the portfolio insurance program 
to be implemented independent of the management of the 
risky assets. External managers or internal stock or bond 
management procedures are not disrupted by the portfolio 
insurance strategy.24 Fourth, the longer-term, European- 
type options that meet the parameters of the types of 
insurance programs that appeal to institutional investors, 
are not available or have limited liquidity. 
3.1.1.1 Problems with Option Replication via Dynamic 
Strategies: Path Dependence 
The dynamic hedging method of replicating options using 
stock index and/or Treasury bill futures in accordance with 
the Black-Scholes' option pricing model [8] or the binomial 
option pricing model of Cox, Ross, and Rubinstein [33] has 
been the most widely used portfolio insurance strategy to 
date. If the replication is done perfectly in a Black- 
Scholes world, the probability of experiencing a loss is 
zero. That is, the option replication strategy is path- 
independent if it is carried out perfectly. 
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The design and monitoring of the replication strategy, as 
well as its execution, are, therefore, important 
considerations. Furthermore, as pointed out by Rubinstein 
[108], imperfections in the strategy also arise from jumps 
in security price movements, uncertain interest rates, 
uncertain volatility, transaction costs, and the apparently 
mispriced securities. Any deviations from the model design 
will increase the replication error and make the option 
replication strategy path-dependent. 
3.1.1.2 Problems with Potion Replication via Dynamic 
Strategies: Time Invariance 
The other problem with option replication via dynamic 
strategies is that the strategy is not time-invariant. A 
time-invariant strategy does not depend on a fixed time 
horizon, or on the time remaining to the program. Since 
the strategy has a defined expiration date, and a payoff 
that is set according to that date, it will depend on the 
amount of time remaining to expiration. The closer the 
program comes to the expiration date, the more exacting the 
hedge will become in moving into the riskless asset if the 
portfolio is below the floor, or into the underlying 
portfolio, if the portfolio is above the floor. 
Time invariance by itself is not a problem in the 
strategy per se. However, time invariance renders 
implementation of the alternative portfolio insurance 
strategies more difficult. There are times when there is 
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an inability to rebalance as rapidly as the delta factors 
dictate in order to maintain delta neutrality, i.e., to 
maintain the delta at the same level as the put-protected 
portfolio. 
A recent example is the events of October 1987 when 
stock prices changed by more than 20% on October 19. The 
problem was that the dynamic portfolio strategies did not 
keep up with falling prices, so that the payoff of the 
replicating portfolio did not match the one with a 
protective put when the market moved too far and too fast. 
The dynamic portfolio insurance strategies only replicated 
the delta of the put-protected portfolio, but not the gamma 
of the portfolio.2^ In contrast, option replication via 
options can match both the delta of the ideal put-protected 
portfolio and also its gamma. Therefore, long-term option 
replication via short-term exchange traded options offers 
alternative strategy to option replication via dynamic 
strategy.27 
3.1.2 Potion Replication Via Options 
A combination of exchange traded options may better 
replicate the desirable characteristics of the insured 
portfolio, such as its delta and its gamma, than the option 
replication via dynamic strategies. This is based on the 
fact that the derivatives of portfolio are the sum of the 
derivatives of all the components of the portfolio. Thus, 
the gamma of a portfolio is just the sum of the gammas of 
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all the components of the portfolio. This is also true for 
the delta and the other derivatives. 
Since a put-protected portfolio has a positive gamma, it 
is difficult to match the behavior of a changing delta 
using a replicating portfolio with a gamma of zero, e.g., 
dynamic asset allocation or dynamic hedging employs stocks, 
T-bills, and futures as replicating instruments which have 
a gamma of zero. Small changes in the portfolio value will 
lead to frequent rebalancings. This is one of the reasons 
why the dynamic portfolio insurance strategies can not cope 
with the turbulent market conditions. When prices fall 
drastically within a short period of time, the zero gamma 
of an insured portfolio using futures prevents the 
portfolio from reacting to the changing value of the 
underlying asset, as the one with a protective put with 
positive gamma would. Therefore, what an option 
replication strategy needs to replicate simultaneously are 
both the delta and the gamma of the put-protected 
portfolio. Since puts and calls both have positive gammas, 
option replication strategies via exchange traded options 
can better match the curvature of the hedge position payoff 
profile. 
Figlewski [44] has proposed a way to create a "gamma 
neutral" replicating portfolio by buying the appropriate 
number of any exchange traded index options, e.g., S&P 500 
option, and then choosing the mix of stock and cash to 
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produce the correct overall delta.2® For instance, to 
protect a $100 million stock portfolio with a delta of 
285,257 and a gamma of 1,626 on October 16, 1987, a 
combination of 322,331 shares of the S&P 500 stock index 
portfolio, $8,179,576 in cash, and 1,924 contracts of 
December 260 S&P 500 put options will give the desirable 
delta and gamma.2^ 
Bookstaber and Langsam [16] have demonstrated that it is 
the curvature of the hedge that dictates the desirability 
of gamma neutral hedging. Because the gamma is a 
decreasing function of time, the comparatively short- 
maturity exchange traded options will be less useful in 
hedging, the longer the time to expiration of the hedge. 
Furthermore, since the gamma is lower, the further the 
portfolio value moves from the exercise price, options will 
be less useful the further the portfolio value moves from 
the floor. An option based strategy will be a more 
effective hedge than a futures based strategy if the gamma 
of the hedge program is greater than one-half the gamma of 
the hedging instrument. Bookstaber and Langsam [16] also 
suggest using both futures and options in a delta/gamma 
neutral hedge to match the delta and the gamma simulta¬ 
neously. Hill and Wood [67] have also suggested that using 
futures and options in the option replication tracks the 
value of the put-protected portfolio better than the 
replication using only futures or options. Haidar [56] has 
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also shown that this approach would incur a lower cost than 
the conventional option replication strategies using 
futures alone. 
There are several reasons that this approach has not 
received much attention until recently. First, exchange 
traded index options are available only in maturities of 
one year or less. In fact, the longest effective maturi¬ 
ties of listed options are only two or three months, most 
of the portfolio insurance strategies implemented have 
taken the form of rolling over replications of puts with 
one to three year horizons. Rollover of options will 
increase the cost of portfolio insurance. Hence, it will 
generally have lower expected returns than dynamic port¬ 
folio insurance (Bookstaber and Langsam [16], Rubinstein 
[108]). Moreover, the strike prices are limited in their 
range. Furthermore, the liquidity of the index options 
markets is low. Consequently, transaction costs are higher 
in terms of the market impact on the option prices and 
commissions. 
3.1.3 The Cost of Portfolio Insurance under Dynamic 
Strategies 
Two important issues associated with the dynamic 
strategies are the impact of futures mispricing and the 
uncertainty regarding realized volatility on insurance 
costs. Both issues are relevant to option based insurance 
strategies as well as to Constant Proportion Portfolio 
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Insurance (CPPI) strategies that are implemented using 
futures. Increases in volatility can interact with the 
path of prices on the risky assets to raise the cost of the 
insurance program to the buyer or increase the returns to 
the seller. Adverse futures mispricing occurs as 
allocation adjustments are made can increase the realized 
cost of the insurance programs. An additional concern is 
that volatility and futures mispricing changes may be 
correlated with each other. A large price move reflects an 
increase in volatility, thereby adding cost, and can also 
be accompanied by adverse futures mispricing, adding 
further cost to the insurance program. 
3.1.3.1 Volatility 
Volatility plays an important role in a portfolio 
insurance program. The cost of an option depends, inter 
alia, on the volatility of the underlying asset. There¬ 
fore, the cost of portfolio insurance also depends on the 
volatility of the asset — the amount the value of the 
asset varies over the protection horizon. 
Volatility measures the degree of price variabilities in 
the market. It is a measure of the standard deviation of 
asset returns. For example, a volatility of 15% means that 
there is an approximately 60% chance (one standard 
deviation) that prices will differ up to 15% from their 
current value in a year. The estimators for volatility 
therefore are essentially variance estimators. The dynamic 
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portfolio insurance strategy - the speed with which the 
hedge ratio (delta) changes as the portfolio changes in 
value - depends on a volatility estimate as an input.30 A 
higher experienced volatility leads to greater frequency of 
buying and selling out of the portfolio in order to 
replicate the payoff pattern of the put, and therefore, to 
greater slippage in tracking the performance of the 
underlying asset. 
Since the dynamic strategies try to replicate a put 
option which insures against the floor value of the 
underlying portfolio through the expiration date, high 
volatility limits the upside capture. This introduces a 
form of path-dependence into the outcome. Also, the 
greater the experienced volatility is, the higher the cost 
of the dynamic asset allocation or dynamic hedging. 
Consequently, estimating volatility is of prime importance 
in the optimization decision process of any portfolio 
insurance programs. 
3.1.3.2 Mispricing of Futures 
For dynamic hedging using futures contracts, the cost of 
portfolio insurance also depends on the fair pricing of the 
futures contract. It is, therefore, useful to review the 
incidence and extent of mispricing and its relationship to 
moves in the respective spot assets. The fair pricing of 
futures contracts is often determined by the cost-of-carry 
model (Hanson and Kopprasch [59], Jarrow and Oldfield [69], 
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Schwarz et al. [112]). In case of the stock index futures: 
FV = I + (i-D) (3.11) 
where: FV = fair value of stock index futures; 
I = index level; 
i = interest earned by investing index level of 
dollar in a riskless asset until expiration of 
the futures contract; 
D = dividends earned on the index until expiration 
of the futures contract. 
Mispricing is defined as the difference between the 
observed stock index futures price and the fair value of 
the futures contract determined by the cost-of-carry model. 
In fact, mispricing is a misnomer. Discrepancies between 
prices do occur for various reasons. The most common ones 
are due to the nonsynchronous trading and reporting of the 
spot and futures prices. 
Nonsynchronous trading has been recognized as an 
inherent problem in the testing of the valuation models 
based on arbitrage approach (Figlewski [45]) . Reasons for 
non-synchronous trading cited include: a large number of 
component stocks makes simultaneous execution difficult; 
bid and ask prices are only for small orders; the last 
sales do not hold for future trades; and the futures market 
often absorbs information faster than the spot market. 
Nonsynchronous reporting arises when the closing times 
of the spot and futures markets are different. For 
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instance, the stock market in Hong Kong closes at 3:30 P.M. 
whereas the futures market starts closing calls at 3:30 
P.M., which may last for an hour. In Japan, there is a 
fifteen minute delay between the time the spot market 
closes and the time the futures market closes and the 
settlement price is determined. 
Due to the above reasons, it is not unreasonable to 
expect to see a departure from the fair value relationship 
due to the rapid movement of both markets and disparities 
in trading costs. Extreme deviations from the fair value 
may indicate that prices are misaligned to the point where 
arbitrage opportunities can be exploited even after 
considering the trading costs. 
If index futures appear to be underpriced, the preferred 
method may be to buy futures against a position in spot, 
rather than selling futures against a long position in the 
index, in a dynamic hedging program. Moreover, the impact 
of futures mispricing can be totally avoided by using 
dynamic asset allocation with stocks and Treasury bills. 
In spite of the possible mispricing of the futures 
contract, the magnitude of mispricing did not impact the 
portfolio insurance costs significantly in the U.S. By 
lengthening the insurance protection horizon, the impact of 
futures mispricing can be reduced further (Hill et al. 
[61]) . 
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3.2 Non-Potion Based Portfolio Insurance Strategies 
Perold [92] has recently offered a portfolio insurance 
decision rule known as Constant Proportion Portfolio 
Insurance (CPPI). The concept of CPPI can be dated back to 
1971 when Merton [84] discussed the optimal portfolio 
selection rule in a continuous time model under 
uncertainty. Following Merton's theoretical framework, 
Black and Jones [7] have proposed a simplified version of 
CPPI.31 
The CPPI approach to portfolio insurance is not 
dependent on "option-type" variables. The horizon of the 
insurance program and the volatility of the risky assets 
are not explicitly incorporated in the decision-making 
processes. The proportion of assets held at risk, or the 
exposure is strictly a function of the distance between the 
portfolio value and some arbitrary floor level, and not the 
time remaining to the end of the program. This strategy 
looks at the portfolio value in excess of the stated floor 
(the floor is assumed to grow over time at the rate of 
interest), and moves the amount of the portfolio placed in 
the risky asset up or down by an amount equal to a factor 
times this excess. It is, basically, a special case of a 
more general set of policies (constant-proportion 
strategies) that also embrace the constant-mix and buy-and- 
hold strategies. As pointed out by Perold and Sharpe [92], 
many investment managers have been using it without knowing 
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it. For example, the well-known 60/40 asset mix is a kind 
of constant proportion portfolio insurance. 
3.2.1 Constant Proportion Portfolio Insurance 
The CPPI strategy is formulated as follows. Let the 
desirable value of the portfolio (payoff) at time t, the 
ending date of the protection program, be which consists 
of a fixed amount of riskless assets, F0t and cushion, C^. 
Thus, 
^t = F0t + ^t (3.12) 
where F0^ represents the level of protection at t (the 
floor) desired by the investor at the time of insuring the 
portfolio by investing a fixed, initial investment, F0 in 
riskless assets earning interest at rate r. 
Hence, 
Fot = FoerT. <3-13> 
represents the portfolio value in excess of the floor or 
the cushion/surplus, i.e., equation 3.12 can be written as 
Ct = Vt - Fot. (3.14) 
Ct is the dollar amount of the portfolio at risk, which can 
be defined as a levered position in risky assets. Let 
be the dollars invested in risky assets at t (the 
exposure), and m be the proportionality factor/multiplier. 
Then, 
st 
-- = m (3.15) 
ct 
i.e., the exposure, S-^ is held constant as a percentage of 
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the cushion, C^. Equation 3.15 can be rewritten as 
St = m * ct- (3.15a) 
Equations 3.12, 3.13, 3.15 completely describe a CPPI 
strategy. The amount of money to be invested in the risky 
asset is determined by the fraction: 
St m * Ct 
vt Ct + Fot 
The payoff of the strategy at t is: 
Vt= Fot + (Vo - Fo) * (St/s0)m*e (1-m) (r+0.5crz)T^ 
From equation 3.16, the following relationships 
delineated: 
(3.16) 
(3.17) 
can be 
(1) If Ct = 0, then St —0. 
(2) If Ct ->od, St/Vt = m. 
The first relationship says that if the cushion, C^, 
declines to zero in value, the fraction of wealth invested 
in the risky asset declines to zero. It implies that: 
Vt = Fot- (3.18) 
That is, the value of the portfolio will not fall below the 
value of the floor. The second relationship asserts that 
when the cushion is large, the fraction invested in the 
risky asset approaches m, i.e., the total portfolio becomes 
levered. That is, equation 3.12 can be rewritten as: 
Vt = St + Ft + Fot (3.19) 
where F^ is the variable amount of riskless assets 
determined by the multiplier, m, while F0^ is fixed at time 
o. 
56 
From equation 3.15a, it can be seen that the probability 
of full investment in risky assets increases when m is 
large and/or the floor is small. When m>l, is the risky 
asset bought on leverage, and Ft< 0; when m=l, is the 
risky asset only since Ft= 0, and when m<l, is the risky 
asset mixed with riskless asset, i.e., F^>0. In order to 
maintain a constant proportion, continuous rebalancing is 
required. If m<l, then rebalancing calls for the purchase 
of additional shares of the risky asset as it falls in 
value. For m>l, (the case of constant leverage) continuous 
rebalancing calls for just the opposite, i.e., the sale of 
shares of the risky asset as it falls in value and the 
purchase of additional shares as it rises in value. The 
multiplier the investor chooses determines the rate at 
which these extremes are approached. The more precisely 
the exposure-cushion relationship is maintained, the more 
frequent the adjustments and the higher the transaction 
costs. 
If exposure is allowed to deviate from its proper value, 
then the performance of the strategy becomes more 
uncertain. The investor makes this tradeoff by choosing 
percentage moves in the cushion that trigger an adjustment. 
Since portfolio can only reach the floor if the cushion 
drops sharply before a trade can be made, the floor, the 
multiplier, and the trading rule completely define a 
portfolio insurance strategy. 
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When no leverage is allowed, the exposure is limited to 
the value of the portfolio, V^. In this case, the exposure 
is : 
St = MIN (Vt, m*(Vt-Fot)), (3.20) 
and there is no simple close-form solution for the payoff 
in terms of the level of the stock market. 
Perold [92] has also proven theoretically that, CPPI is 
the only strategy that will satisfy both path-independent 
and time-invariant criteria. However, Bookstaber and 
Langsam [16] point out that in practice, the CPPI is 
heuristic — one of a number of arbitrary filter rules or 
trading rules for meeting the floor. It does not contain a 
foundation for analytical study. Because of this, 
questions such as, why one constant is preferable to 
another, or what distributional properties will be obtained 
by changes in the constant, are difficult to answer. As a 
result, the CPPI is difficult to use in applications where 
the objective is to alter the return distribution in a 
well-defined manner, or where the cost of portfolio 
insurance needs to be specified. Another drawback of CPPI 
is that with very large upward moves in the value of the 
risky asset, the total portfolio becomes levered. Insti¬ 
tutional and other restrictions may well prohibit such 
leverage. In that case, the CPPI has become path- 
dependent as noted by Perold. 
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Theoretically, the only scenario in which the portfolio 
value can fall below the floor under CPPI is if the market 
drops precipitously before one has had the chance to 
rebalance. Just how precipitous the decline must be 
depends on the multiplier. More generally, the market can 
fall by as much as 1/m with no rebalancing before the floor 
is endangered. Nonetheless, with random jumps in the 
prices, both the dynamic strategy and CPPI failed to 
maintain the floor. 
CHAPTER 4 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
4.1 Scope of Study 
In this study, only country-specific portfolio insurance 
programs are considered. In other words, we are not going 
to consider the exchange risk. All the tests conducted in 
this study are based on the local currencies. The currency 
risk problem can be assumed away in two ways. First, for 
country-specific portfolio insurance schemes, exchange risk 
problem will not occur for nationals of that country. 
Second, for the U.S. investors or for investors who invest 
in U.S. dollars, the exchange risk is presumed to be hedged 
away by foreign currency forward/futures contracts and/or 
options.22 The feasibility of implementing separate 
portfolio insurance programs on assets and currencies is 
left for future research. 
The countries, besides U.S., which have exchange-traded 
stock index futures and have enough breadth and depth to 
permit continuous trading within the trading hours include 
Hong Kong and Japan. The volume and open interest of 
contracts traded are presented in Tables 2 and 3 (pp. 61- 
2). The Hang Seng Index futures of Hong Kong and the 
Nikkei 225 futures of Japan are chosen to be examined in an 
international equity portfolio insurance program in this 
study due to their liquidity. 
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Table 2 
Volume and 
Hang Seng 
5/6/86 
Open Interest: 
Index Futures. 
- 7/31/87 
(a) Volume* by Contract Month 
Contract Months 
MONTH 5/86 6/86 7/86 8/86 9/86 10/86 11/86 12/86 
5/86 12124 15410 703 
6/86 19693 16449 0 2184 
7/86 30051 28156 6909 
8/86 44193 33970 4094 
9/86 61322 49297 7542 
10/86 98890 81128 5483 
11/86 82664 68866 
12/86 79353 
1/87 2/87 3/87 4/87 5/87 6/87 7/87 8/87 
11/86 2563 
12/86 66969 4792 
4/87 82343 95804 7159 
2/87 88412 117372 17010 
3/87 147359 163265 12692 
4/87 134629 133527 8008 
5/87 139226 145947 7792 
6/87 149628 181837 
7/87 203577 27934 
(b) 
Month 
Monthly Volume 
Volume* 
and Open Interest 
Avg. Daily 
Ooen Interest* 
5/86 12124 504.44 
6/86 37412 922.18 
7/86 47203 1104.18 
8/86 72349 1437.30 
9/86 104385 1528.20 
10/86 152281 2002.30 
11/86 171334 3255.00 
12/86 153702 2853.30 
1/87 151875 3246.10 
2/87 189008 4221.40 
3/87 271890 4657.40 
4/87 314904 8046.10 
5/87 285445 6024.30 
6/87 303583 6214.50 
7/87 393206 7834.60 
* Number of Contracts 
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Table 3 
Volume and Open Interest: 
Nikkei 225 Futures. 
9/3/86 - 7/31/87 
(a) Volume 
Contract Months 
MONTH 12/86 3/87 6/87 9/87** 12/87* 
Monthly 
* Total 
9/86 13020 169 2 - - 13191 
10/86 7307 19 0 - - 7326 
11/86 3701 478 38 - - 4217 
12/86 3190 2987 4 — — 6181 
1/87 — 3752 42 - — 3794 
2/87 — 7120 720 — - 7840 
3/87 — 6760 13380 85 8 20233 
4/87 — - 15199 68 131 15398 
5/87 — - 21871 1085 56 23012 
6/87 - — 15146 33192 68 48406 
7/87 — — — 47375 380 47755 
TOTAL 27218 21285 66402 81805 643 197353 
AVE.PER 
MONTH 6804.5 3040.7 6640.2 7436.8 58.5 
* Volume does not include the spot month contracts. 
** Counted only up to 7/31/87. 
(b) Open Interest 
9/3/86 - 7/31/87 
12/86 3/87 6/87 9/87 12/87 
AVERAGE DAILY 
OPEN INTEREST 1157.6 905.2 2207.2 3067.2 87.1 
ALL CONTRACT 
DAILY AVERAGE OPEN INTEREST : 3334.3 
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Both the Nikkei 225 and the Hang Seng Index are the 
most widely observed stock market indices in their 
countries, and their futures contracts possess some 
interesting attributes which are worth noting. First, the 
Nikkei 225 futures contract is the first stock index 
futures contract based on the local stock index and 
currency denomination (in Yen), but being traded in a 
foreign country. Thus, arbitrage is expected to be carried 
out with restrictions across national borders. In fact, at 
the beginning of the trading of the contract, Japanese 
nationals were not allowed to trade foreign stock index 
futures, while foreign firms were restricted in trading on 
the Tokyo Stock Exchange. Second, the Hang Seng Index 
futures had been the second most actively traded stock 
index futures after the S&P 500 futures contract. In 
addition, there is a growing interest in investing in these 
countries. 
For comparison purposes, the S&P 500 futures contract is 
also being examined in this study as a benchmark. It is 
hoped that by comparing the results against those of the 
S&P 500, the differences of these markets will be reflected 
and insights will be gained as to how to apply and adapt 
the domestic portfolio insurance strategies to foreign 
markets. 
Since there is no exchange-traded option in Japan or in 
Hong Kong, option replication via options will not be 
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considered in this study.^3 Instead, the following 
alternative portfolio insurance strategies described in 
Chapter 3 will be examined in this study: 
(1) a dynamic hedging program using stock index 
futures, and 
(2) a Constant Proportion Portfolio Insurance program. 
To provide an expected portfolio insurance cost, a 
hypothetical put is created using the binomial option 
pricing model and used to protect the portfolio to be 
insured. The portfolio to be insured is the stock index 
itself for each country studied.The put is assumed to 
be purchased outright at the beginning, and thus this 
strategy, as we refer to it as the put-protected strategy 
is a static one. The dynamic strategies (1) and (2) above 
are used to replicate the put over the protection horizon. 
Funds for the purchase of the options come from the 
portfolio. 
This study proceeds in the following order. First, we 
examine the market volatility and the mispricing of futures 
contracts. Second, we analyze the impact of the market 
volatility and of the mispricing of futures contracts on 
the actual cost of portfolio insurance for the period 
studied. Third, a distribution of portfolio insurance 
costs using historical data is simulated and analyzed. The 
impact of the subjective choice parameters on the costs of 
portfolio insurance programs is also examined. 
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4.2 Description of Data 
For the analysis of the actual costs of portfolio 
insurance, daily data on stock indices, dividend yields, 
and stock index futures have been collected from the 
Exchanges. The data begins from the first date of trading 
to July 31, 1987 for the Hang Seng Index and the Nikkei 
225, and the comparable period for the S&P 500. ^5 Data on 
Treasury bills rates or equivalent interest rates (e.g., 
the Gensaki rates or "repo" rates from Japan, and interbank 
offer rates from Hong Kong) have been collected for the 
corresponding periods. 
Daily and monthly data related to the S&P 500 including 
the futures prices as at 4:00 P.M., 3-month interest rates, 
and dividend yields are obtained from the Financial Futures 
Department of Kidder, Peabody. For the Nikkei 225 and 
futures, closing prices are obtained from the Equity 
Futures Daily Information Bulletins from the Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange/Singapore International Monetary 
Exchange (SIMEX). 
For the Nikkei 225, the dividend yield used in the 
insurance cost computation (option computation) is the 
annualized dividend yield (approx. 0.3%) based on the 
average prices and the actual payout for the period 
obtained from Interactive Data Corporation. To calculate 
the fair prices of futures, the actual payout is used. The 
dividend yields for the Hang Seng Index are obtained from 
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the Economic Journal of Hong Kona. Interest rates are the 
interbank offer rates (1 month and 6 months) obtained from 
Hang Seng Bank. Futures prices as at 3:30 P.M. are made 
available by the Hong Kong Futures Exchange. 
The futures data series are based on the nearby 
contracts rolled over before the month of delivery. 
Contract specifications of the stock index futures are 
attached in Appendices B, C, and D. 
4.3 Methodology 
4.3.1 Estimation of Volatility 
Volatility can be estimated by the maximum likelihood 
variance estimator from the historical data using closing 
prices. But estimating volatility with only closing prices 
ignores other valuable information, such as the intraday 
fluctuations. Due to the unavailability of data, we can 
only use the classical estimators. However, it should be 
borne in mind that if other more efficient estimators, such 
as Garman and Klass estimators of volatility, are used to 
estimate the volatility, the cost of portfolio insurance 
should be lower than it is reported here.^6 
Since volatility has certain characteristics of a 
nonstationary process, the question in hand is what time 
period of returns to use for the volatility estimation, and 
how many past data points to use to get a good estimate of 
the volatility. To avoid the non-stationarity problem, a 
short period of returns should be used. But, at the same 
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time, the return series used should be long enough to 
reflect the recent trend of the market. We, therefore, use 
one year return data immediately prior to the first date of 
the selected period as a basis for volatility measurement. 
In the simulations of the distribution of portfolio 
insurance costs, we use the average of the annualized 
standard deviations from the period of 1971-1987. 
The number of trading days in a year may affect the 
magnitude of the estimate of volatility, and consequently, 
the estimates of portfolio insurance cost. Results of this 
study will differ if different numbers of trading days are 
used to annualize the standard deviations. In this study, 
we use the averages of trading days of several years: 250, 
246, and 284 days for the U.S.A., Hong Kong, and Japan, 
respectively. 
4.3.2 Mispricing of Futures 
The mispricing of futures is discussed in section 
3.1.3.2. Usually, the mispricing of futures, or a violation 
of the arbitrage conditions are measured in 3 ways. The 
first is to measure the difference between the theoretical 
(i.e., arbitrage-free) price according to the cost-of-carry 
model and the observed price. However, this method is not 
suitable for comparison purposes because it is not scale- 
free. The second method is to measure the difference as a 
percentage of the spot index or the theoretical futures 
price. This will normalize different price levels. In 
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this study, we divide the mispricing by the underlying spot 
index. The third method is to compare the implied hedge 
returns and the risk-free interest rates. The implied 
hedge return without transaction costs is calculated as: 
(FP-CP)/CP *(365/(ED-CD)) + Dividend Yield/100 (4.1) 
where: FP = futures prices; 
CP = cash prices; 
ED = ending date of the program; 
BD = beginning date of the program. 
The excess implied hedge return is defined as the 
difference between the implied hedge return and the risk¬ 
free interest rate. In an efficient market, the excess 
implied hedge return should not be greater than the 
transaction cost. 
4.3.3 Foregone Returns as Costs of Portfolio Insurance 
Since portfolio insurance seeks to provide downside 
protection for an upside foregone return, one way to define 
cost of portfolio insurance is the upside give-up. The 
upside give-up should be equal to the cost of the put 
option which is used to provide the positively skewed 
return distribution. In other words, it is the price that 
the buyer of portfolio insurance is willing to pay for the 
positive skewness. 
The actual costs of alternative portfolio insurance 
strategies in terms of foregone returns are analyzed for 
the period from the first day of trading for the Nikkei 225 
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and the Hang Seng Index futures to July 31, 1987. The 
costs of alternative portfolio insurance strategies as 
applied to the S&P 500 are also analyzed for the same 
period. 
The foregone costs include the explicit and implicit 
components. After accounting for the explicit costs (i.e., 
the implementation costs of option replication), the 
implicit costs represent the economic cost. Results from 
section 4.3.2 will provide an estimate of how much of the 
foregone cost is accounted for by futures mispricing. 
The realized costs of portfolio insurance strategies are 
then compared with the expected costs of portfolio 
insurance. The expected costs of portfolio insurance are 
derived from the premium of a hypothetical put option 
written on the underlying portfolio as if it were traded at 
the beginning of the portfolio insurance program with the 
same parameters. 
Option values are generated from Cox, Ross and 
Rubinstein's [33] binomial option pricing model (Appendix 
F). The binomial option pricing model is used in this 
study for the following reasons. First, the binomial model 
allows the use of different risk-free rates for different 
periods. Second, for long-term options, the binomial 
option pricing model provides a more accurate option value 
than the Black-Scholes' model.^8 
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4.3.4 Distribution of Portfolio Insurance Costs 
While the above analysis using actual historical data 
provides the actual costs of portfolio insurance in Japan 
and Hong Kong for the year tested, the results are period- 
specific. Since the potential buyers of portfolio 
insurance care about more than the average cost for a 
period of time, and want to know more about the likelihood 
of doing much worse than the average, particularly with 
reference to the shortfall, we simulate a distribution of 
portfolio insurance costs over the period January 1971 to 
July 1987 -- a period that encompassed numerous upward and 
downward swings as well as catastrophic jumps for both the 
Japanese and Hong Kong stock markets. 
Yearly returns for each index are generated for 188 
overlapping years (cycle years) by moving the window by a 
month each time. Thus, the first cycle year is comprised 
of the returns for the period from January 1971 to December 
1971, the second being February 1971 to January 1972, and 
so on. The last one is for the period of August 1986 
through July 1987. These returns, together with data on 
dividends and riskless interest rates, are used to generate 
188 cycles of 1-year index returns. Although they are not 
independent, they provide useful variations. These returns 
are used to generate the distribution of insurance costs 
for alternative portfolio insurance strategies. This is 
repeated for programs with a horizon of three years. There 
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are 164 cycles of 3-year index returns. The first one runs 
from January 1971 to December 1973, the last one being 
August 1984 to July 1987. 
Following Garcia and Gould's [52], and Clarke and 
Arnott's [29] procedures, in our simulations, costs of 
alternative portfolio insurance strategies are measured in 
the following ways: 
(1) the long-run average historical cost, LRAC, as 
determined by the difference between the yearly returns of 
the stock index of the respective country, RI and those of 
the insured portfolio, R; 
n=l 
LRAC = l/n2(RIfRt) ; (4.2) 
t 
(2) the average shortfall, ASF, calculated as the average 
of the annual index return minus the insured portfolio 
returns, where the average is taken only over those years 
in which the market outperformed the insured portfolio: 
n=l 
ASF = l/n2(RIfRt) ' for RIt >/ Rt'* (4.3) 
t 
(3) the average up-year give-up, AUG, calculated as the 
average of the annual index returns minus the insured 
portfolio returns, where the average is taken only over 
those years in which the index returns were positive: 
n=l 
AUG = l/n2u(RIt~Rt) ' for RIt > °' and (4.4) 
t 
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(4) the average downside excess, ADE, calculated as the 
average of the annual index returns minus the insured 
portfolio returns, where the average is taken only 
overthose years in which the index returns were negative: 
n=l 
ADE = l/n2(RIt-Rt) ' for RIt < 0- (4.5) 
t 
Therefore, this study examines empirically the extent to 
which portfolio insurance would have captured upside moves 
as well as downside excess in the underlying equity market 
for different program parameters. 
For portfolio insurance strategies using futures 
contracts, the theoretical values of the stock index 
futures are determined by the cost-of-carry model as in 
equation 3.11. It is assumed that the futures are fairly 
priced over the period. Thus, the long-run average costs 
of portfolio insurance from the simulations represent the 
economic costs of portfolio insurance. 
In addition, the results from portfolio insurance 
strategies in each country will be compared with the 
results from: 
1. an 100 percent allocation to the stock index (with 
dividends reinvested); 
2. a static allocation of 60 percent to the stock index and 
40 percent to a one-year riskless asset; 
3. a static allocation of 90 percent to the stock index and 
10 percent to a one-year riskless asset. 
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The 100% allocation to the stock index is the buy-and- 
hold strategy. However, most portfolio insurance end-users 
are pension funds who usually hedge their stock holdings 
with Treasuries, if portfolio insurance is not in place. 
Therefore, it is also appropriate to use Treasury bill/bond 
portfolios (e.g., (2) and (3)) as benchmarks.^9 
In addition, the cost of portfolio insurance for the 
countries studied will also be compared to the cost of 
portfolio insurance in the U.S. for the S&P 500. By doing 
so, it gives some indications to the U.S. investors on the 
costs of alternative international portfolio insurance 
strategies. 
4.4 Program Parameters 
4.4.1 Protection Horizon 
The protection horizon for the actual costs covers the 
period of the first day of trading of futures to July 31, 
1987. For the Hang Seng Index, it was 1.23 years or 452 
calendar days. For the Nikkei 225, it was 0.91 year or 332 
days. For the S&P 500, the periods protected were same as 
the ones for the Hang Seng Index and the Nikkei 225. 
The protection horizons of the insurance programs that 
are considered in the simulations are 1 and 3 years. They 
are also typical of those selected by portfolio insurers in 
the U.S. Three-year insurance programs are the most 
popular because they coincide with the normal planning 
horizon of institutional investors such as pension funds 
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and endowments, and because they are less sensitive to 
unstable volatility as well as to futures mispricing (Hill 
et al. [61]). 
4.4.2 Floor 
The floor returns that are used in this study are 0 and 
-5%. These are also the typical floor return levels used 
in the U.S. by the portfolio insurance users. The floor, 
as distinguished from the floor return, is the total value 
of the exercise price of the puts written on the insured 
portfolio. If the portfolio value drops below the floor 
value, the put option will give a payoff equal to the 
difference between the final portfolio value and the floor. 
The size of the deductible is determined by the floor 
plus any income earned during the insurance period. A 
lower floor leads to a higher deductible, and to a lower 
cost of the protection. The historical return distribution 
of the asset can provide guidelines for setting the floor. 
The amount of coverage is determined by the face value 
of the portfolio insurance policy. For coverage less than 
100%, it is termed co-insurance. Coinsurance leads to 
lower costs for protection. For protection against smaller 
downturns, coinsurance will usually be a less costly form 
of protection. However, for protection against very large 
market losses — catastrophic insurance or full insurance 
with a high deductible will usually be better than 
coinsurance. For this reason, in this study, we only 
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consider the case of full coverage. For the CPPI strategy, 
the protection levels (or the floors) are set at 80% and 
90% of the initial portfolio value. 
4.4.3 Rebalance Interval 
The rebalance interval for adjusting the actual equity 
allocation to the target level varies among investors. The 
choice of rebalance interval depends on the attitudes of 
the investors towards tradeoffs between the higher trading 
costs that accompany more frequent adjustments and the 
reduction in the replication error. The market lag 
discipline of rebalancing will be used in this study, i.e., 
the portfolio will be rebalanced only when the value of the 
underlying index changes by more than a prescribed 
percentage (lag factor) of the previous trade level. In 
this study, we use 0%, 3% and 10%. 
4.4.4 Transaction Costs 
The transaction cost of a trade arising from portfolio 
insurance includes 3 components: the commission; the market 
impact of the trade itself; and the mispricing of futures 
(in dynamic hedging). Commissions are typically fixed per 
contract. Market impact is harder to pinpoint. It depends 
not only on the size of the trade, but also on the 
liquidity of the market at the time the trade occurs and 
the size of the market on which the trade will be executed. 
Traders' opinions will provide a fair estimate. 
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The final component of trading costs is the estimate of 
the mispricing expected to prevail on average when option 
replicating trades must be executed with stock index 
futures. In a previous study on the S&P 500, Hill et al. 
[61] used 0.5% (of the volume of transactions) as a 
conservative estimate, 1% as a moderately high estimate, 
and 1.75% as unusually high level of mispricing estimation. 
These costs vary from markets to markets. Analyses of 
futures mispricing on the Nikkei 225, Hang Seng, and S&P 
500 are presented and discussed in Chapter 5. 
The estimates of the total transaction costs for cash 
transactions for the S&P 500, Nikkei 225, and Hang Seng are 
presented in Table 4 (p. 77). The estimate of the 
transaction cost for the Nikkei 225 is adapted from Brenner 
et al. [26]. It is estimated for a typical index 
arbitrageur on a 500 million Yen trade for the brokers. 
The transaction cost estimates for the Hang Seng Index is 
obtained from Vickers da Costa, a Hong Kong brokerage 
house.41 For the S&P 500 the estimate is obtained from 
Kidder, Peabody.42 All of the estimates are those for the 
brokers. 
Given the same parameters of a portfolio insurance 
program, the cost of the dynamic asset allocation strategy 
is expected to be higher than those of the dynamic hedging 
strategy and the CPPI, if the securities are fairly priced. 
A put-protected strategy costs least if the realized 
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Table 4 
Estimates 
Jaoan 
Taxes 0 . 55% 
Commission 0 . 30% 
Market Impact 0.40% 
Single Trip 1.25% 
Transaction Costs. 
Hona Kona U.S. 
0 . 3% — 
0 . 5% 0.125% 
0.6% 0.700% 
1.4% 0.825% 
Sources: Japan - Brenner et al. [26] 
Hong Kong - Vickers da Costa 
U.S. - Kidder, Peabody 
volatility is greater than the anticipated volatility 
compared to dynamic portfolio insurance strategies and 
constant proportion portfolio insurance. The realized 
costs of alternative strategies can be attributed to the 
user's tolerance of the tradeoff between the implementation 
cost and the replication error, the experienced market 
volatility, and the efficiency of the markets. 
Hence, the adoption of a particular strategy is the 
result of a subjective preference for the tradeoff between 
costs and replication errors, and an objective element 
which is governed by the implementation of the strategy, 
the market movements, and the efficiency of the markets. 
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CHAPTER 5 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
In this chapter the empirical results are presented in 
the following order. First, the nature of the market 
volatility and mispricing of futures contracts are 
presented. Second, the realized costs of portfolio 
insurance using actual data for the selected period are 
analyzed. Third, the results from the simulated 
distributions of portfolio insurance costs are examined. 
The impact of the subjective choice parameters on the costs 
of portfolio insurance programs is also examined and 
discussed. 
5.1 Market Volatility 
Table 5 (p. 80) lists the historical yearly volatility 
of the Hang Seng Index for the period 1971-1987 based on 
the daily logarithmic of closing price relatives. The 
stock market of Hong Kong displayed great volatility in the 
past. The average annualized volatility for the period is 
28.95%. The greatest volatility reached as high as 65.69% 
in 1973 when it crashed from its historical high of over 
1700 points, and as low as 10.58% in 1977 which is the 
smallest volatility for the Hang Seng Index for the past 18 
years before October 1987. 
In Table 6 (p. 81), the historical volatility of the 
Nikkei 225 is given. Similar to the Hang Seng Index, the 
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Table 5 
Historical Volatility: 
Hang Seng Index. 
1/1971 - 7/1987 
Standard 
Year Deviation f%)* 
1971 29.94 
1972 27.22 
1973 65.69 
1974 45.95 
1975 36.04 
1976 22.57 
1977 10 . 58 
1978 26.51 
1979 22.89 
1980 31.01 
1981 32.42 
1982 37.34 
1983 30.49 
1984 29.46 
1985 21.87 
1986 17.06 
1987** 19.62 
Average 29.80 
* These are computed based on the daily logarithmic 
returns of the index annualized by the number of trading 
days for the year. 
** To end of July. 
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Table 6 
Historical Volatility: 
Nikkei 225. 
1/1971 - 7/1987 
Year 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 * * 
Average 
Standard 
Deviation f%)* 
24.31 
6.91 
17.80 
18.57 
18.12 
15.37 
9.18 
6.15 
5.88 
7.32 
9.09 
13 . 54 
7.31 
19.21 
14.97 
20.33 
17.04 
13.55 
* These are computed based on the daily logarithmic 
returns of the index annualized by the number of 
trading days for the year. 
** To end of July. 
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Nikkei 225 experienced great volatility in the past 18 
years. However, the range is not as great as that for the 
Hang Seng Index. The greatest volatility is 24.31% in 
1971, and the smallest is 5.88% in 1979. 
These estimates of volatility, however, only describe 
the volatility of the market on a calendar basis. If the 
portfolio insurance program is initiated in a month other 
than January, the volatility as relevant to the insurance 
program will be different from the one initiated in 
January. 
In Table 7 (p. 83), the classical estimators of market 
volatility using daily closing prices for the period since 
the inception of the Nikkei 225 and Hang Seng Index futures 
to July 31, 1987 are given for the Nikkei 225, Hang Seng, 
and S&P 500 indices and futures. Results show that both 
the Japanese and Hong Kong stock markets have experienced 
greater volatilities than the U.S. for the period studied. 
Other things being equal, it is expected that the cost of 
portfolio insurance would be higher in these countries than 
it would be in the U.S. due to higher volatility. 
Also, in Table 7 (p. 83), the relative volatilites of 
spot and futures prices are given. Relative volatility is 
defined as the ratio of the mean percentage change of 
futures prices to the mean percentage change of the 
underlying market index. The futures market can reflect 
new information upon its arrival and incorporate it in the 
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Table 7 
Annualized Volatility: 
Stock Index and Futures. 
Nikkei 225, Hang Seng, S&P 500 
Volatility 
9/3/1986- 
Nikkei 225 
7/31/1987 
S&P 500 
5/6/1986- 
Hana Sena 
■7/31/1987 
S&P 500 
Index 19.56% 15.53% 18.18% 15.22% 
Futures(nearby) 21.59% 17.48% 17.71% 17.12% 
Difference 2.03% 1.95% -0.47% 1.89% 
pricing process faster than the spot market. In rapidly 
moving markets, the futures prices tend to lead the spot 
prices. One important source of the greater futures 
volatility is the volatility of the mispricing. Another 
source of volatility in futures relative to the index is 
the variation in net-carry costs as measured by the net of 
interest changes and dividends. 
The U.S. futures markets have displayed greater 
volatility than the respective spot markets.43 The S&P 500 
futures had a volatility of 17.48%, whereas the spot index 
displayed a volatility of 15.53%. For the same period, the 
Nikkei 225 futures prices displayed a greater volatility 
than the spot prices (21.59% vs. 19.56%). In contrast, the 
Hang Seng Index experienced a greater volatility than the 
futures, though the difference which is less than half a 
percent, is small. This may suggest that the spot price is 
leading the futures price instead of lagging it as it is 
the case for the S&P 500 and the Nikkei 225. 
These estimates of volatility derived from the 
historical data are used as an input to generate the 
expected cost of portfolio insurance in this analysis. 
5.2 Results on Mispricing of Futures 
In this section, the results on the mispricing of the 
Nikkei 225, Hang Seng Index, and S&P 500 futures are 
presented. Mispricing of futures is expressed as a 
percentage of the underlying spot index. Both the Nikkei 
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225 and the Hang Seng futures contracts are found to be 
"mispriced" in their first year of trading, according to 
the cost-of-carry model. For the same period, the S&P 500 
futures were slightly mispriced, but within the transaction 
cost boundary. 
5.2.1 Nikkei 225 
The Nikkei 225 futures contract had been significantly 
undervalued, and discounts persisted for the period 
examined. The distribution of the Nikkei 225 futures 
mispricing for 9/3/86 - 7/31/87 is presented in Table 8 (p. 
86), and charted in Figures 3 and 4 (pp. 87-8). 
The mispricings fell between -4.59% and 1.96% of the 
spot index value. The mean mispricing for the whole period 
is 155.06 index points or -0.76%, with a standard deviation 
of 1.37%. The majority (63.43%) of the mispricing fell 
into the negative range. Of all the negative mispricings, 
over half of them are smaller than -1%. Positive mis¬ 
pricing which is greater than 1% only accounts for 5.56% of 
the total cases of mispricing. The underpricing of the 
Nikkei 225 futures is consistent with the pricing behavior 
of the S&P 500 futures during the early trading period.44 
The persistence of discounts in the Nikkei 225 futures 
contracts seems to suggest that the arbitrage mechanism did 
not operate effectively in the Nikkei 225 futures market. 
In contrast, for the same period as presented in Table 9 
(p. 89), approximately 37% of the S&P 500 mispricing is 
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Table 8 
Distribution of Mispricing: 
Nikkei 225 Futures. 
9/3/1986 - 7/31/1987 
Freer. Interval Freer. % Cumulative 
< -4.5% 1 0.46 0.46 
-4.5%, -4.0% 2 0.93 1. 39 
-4.0%, -3 . 5% 7 3.24 4.63 
-3.5%, -3.0% 7 3.24 7.87 
-3.0%, -2.5% 12 5 . 56 13.43 
-2.5%, -2.0% 14 6.48 19.91 
-2.0%, -1.5% 10 4.63 24.54 
-1.5%, -1.0% 29 13.43 37.96 
-1.0%, 0.0% 55 25.46 63.43 
0.0%, 0 . 5% 41 18.98 82.41 
0.5%, 1.0% 26 12.04 94.44 
1.0%, 1. 5% 9 4.17 98.61 
1.5%, 2.0% 3 1. 39 100.00 
Max. 1.96% 
Min. -4.59% 
Mean -0.76% 
Std. dev. 1. 37% 
# of Obs. 216 
Summary of Mispricing Cumulative Frequency 
<-l% <0% >1% >1.5% 
37.96% 63.43% 5.56% 1.39% 
86 
F
R
E
Q
U
E
N
C
Y
 
NIKKEI 225 FUTURES MISPRICING 
DISTRIBUTION (9/3/1986 - 7/31/1987) 
60 -t  
MISPRICING AS * OF SPOT INDEX 
Figure 3 Distribution of Nikkei 225 
Futures Mispricing. 
M
IS
P
R
IC
IN
G
 
A
S
 
K
 
O
F
 
S
P
O
T
 
NIKKEI 225 FUTURES MISPRICING 
9/3/1966 - 7/31/1937 
DATE 
Figure 4 Nikkei 225 Futures Mispricing. 
88 
Table 9 
Distribution of Mispricing: 
S&P 500 Index Futures. 
9/3/86 - 7/31/87 
Frea. Interval Frea. % Cumulative % 
< -1.00% 1 0.43 0.43 
-1.00%, -0.50% 16 6.93 7.36 
-0.50%, -0.40% 12 5 . 19 12.55 
-0.40%, -0.30% 6 2.60 15 . 15 
-0.30%, -0.25% 3 1.30 16.45 
-0.25%, -0.20% 5 2.16 18.61 
-0.20%, -0.10% 10 4.33 22.94 
-0.10%, -0.05% 10 4.33 27.27 
-0.05%, 0.00% 17 7.36 34.63 
0.00%, 0.05% 17 7 . 36 41.99 
0.05%, 0 . 10% 20 8.66 50.65 
0.10%, 0.20% 44 19.05 69.70 
0.20%, 0.25% 18 7.79 77.49 
0.25%, 0 . 30% 21 9.09 86.58 
0.30%, 0.40% 19 8.23 94.81 
0.40%, 0 . 50% 7 3.03 97.84 
0.50%, 0 .55% 5 2.16 100.00 
Max. 0.54% 
Min. -1.17% 
Mean 0.027% 
Std. Dev. 0.304% 
# of Obs. 231 
Summarv of Misoricina Cumulative Frecruencv 
<-l% 
0 . 32% 
<0% 
37.26% 
>0.1% 
48.40% 
>0.5% 
1.59% 
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negative. In addition, the mispricing fell into a tight 
range of -1.17% to 0.54% (Figure 5, p. 91). The average 
mispricing over the whole period is only 0.02%, with a 
standard deviation of 0.3%. Unlike the mispricing of the 
Nikkei 225 futures, this kind of mispricing is within the 
trading cost boundary, and provides evidence of a more 
active arbitrage market. 
Further insights can be obtained by examining the 
breakdown of the mispricing of the Nikkei 225 futures by 
contract in Tables 10 and 11 (pp. 92-3). Except for the 
March 87 contract which had observed more incidences of 
positive mispricing than the negative ones, all other 
contracts in the sample are dominated by negative 
mispricing. For example, in Table 11(a) (p. 93), it shows 
that for the December 87 contract, there were 49 days which 
had observed negative mispricing with a mean of -1.85% of 
the spot index. There were only 9 days of positive 
mispricing with a mean of 0.36%. 
It is also noted from Table 11(a) (p. 93) that the 
average magnitude of positive mispricing had been 
increasing since December 1986. The average negative 
mispricing tended to increase, except for the March 87 
contract. This does not seem to support the notion that 
arbitrage activities would narrow the range of mispricing 
over time in the Nikkei 225 futures market as found in most 
new stock index futures markets in the U.S. 
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Table 10 
Distribution of Mispricing: 
Nikkei 225 Futures. 
(a) Distribution of Mispricing By Contract 
Contract Month 
Freq. 
Interval 12/86 3/87 6/87 9/87 
Whole 
Period 
< -4.5% 1 0 0 0 1 
-4.5%, -4.0% 2 0 0 0 2 
-4.0%, -3 . 5% 7 0 0 0 7 
-3.5%, -3.0% 2 0 2 3 7 
-3.0%, -2.5% 4 0 2 6 12 
-2.5%, -2.0% 4 0 0 10 14 
-2.0%, -1.5% 5 0 2 3 10 
-1.5%, -1.0% 6 4 13 6 29 
-1.0%, 0.0% 18 18 16 3 55 
0.0%, 0 . 5% 6 22 10 3 41 
0.5%, 1.0% 3 10 8 5 26 
1.0%, 1.5% 0 1 3 5 9 
1.5%, 2.0% 0 0 2 1 3 
Total 58 55 58 45 216 
(b) Summary Statistics 
12/86 3/87 6/87 9/87 Whole Period 
Min. -4.59% -1.42% ■3.18% -3.40% -4.59% 
Max. 0.88% 1.07% 1.96% 1.85% 1.96% 
Mean -1.51% -0.01% •0.42% -1.14% -0.76% 
Std. Dev. 1.49% 0.62% 1. 14% 1. 57% 1.37% 
# of Obs. 58 55 58 45 216 
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Table 11 
Nikkei 225 Futures Mispricing 
(By Contract). 
(a) No Transaction Costs 
Contract POS NEG MEAN+ MEAN- MEAN ABS MEAN MSOR #OBS 
12/86 9 49 0 . 36% -1.85% 1.62% 4.48% 58 
3/87 33 22 0.40% -0.63% 0.49% 0.38% 55 
6/87 23 35 0.71% -1. 17% 0.99% 1.47% 58 
9/87 14 31 0.92% -2.08% 1.72% 3.73% 45 
All 79 137 0 . 58% -1.53% 1. 18% 2.47% 216 
(b) Transaction costs = 1% 
Contract POS NEG MEAN+ MEAN- MEAN ABS MEAN MSOR UOBS 
12/86 0 31 0 -2.64% 2.64% 8.14% 31 
3/87 1 4 1. 07% -1.32% 1.27% 1.64% 5 
6/87 5 19 1.52% -1.64% 1.61% 3.05% 24 
9/87 6 28 1.30% -2.23% 2.07% 4.78% 34 
All 12 82 1.37% -2.21% 2.10% 5.28% 94 
(C) Transaction costs = 1.25% 
Contract POS NEG MEAN+ MEAN- MEAN ABS MEAN MSOR #OBS 
12/86 0 28 0 -2.80% 2.80% 8.20% 28 
3/87 0 3 0 -1.36% 1.36% 3.75% 3 
6/87 4 12 1.60% -1.95% 1.86% 3.60% 16 
9/87 3 27 1. 51% -2.27% 2.20% 6.81% 30 
All 7 70 1. 57% -2.39% 2.32% 6.53% 77 
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Even if transaction costs are taken into consideration, 
a significant number of cases of negative mispricing still 
existed. In Table ll(b,c) (p. 93), the distribution of 
mispricing by contract in Table 11(a) (p. 93) is redone 
with 1% and 1.25% of transaction costs. Some of the 
positive mispricing disappeared, but the negatives did not. 
This may be due to the fact that short-selling is 
prohibited in Japan, and thus, arbitrage can be done only 
in one direction when the futures is at a premium. 
Another way of looking at the futures mispricing is to 
compare the implied hedge returns with the risk-free 
interest rates. In an efficient market, the return from a 
riskless arbitrage on the stock index futures should equal 
the risk-free rate after the transaction costs. Since 
brokers and investors have different transaction cost 
structures, it is difficult to conclude whether the futures 
are mispriced, if transaction costs are included in the 
analysis. Thus, we compare only the implied hedge returns 
without transaction costs with the risk-free rates. A band 
of arbitrage-free price differentials should then exist 
between the theoretical and observed futures prices because 
of the transaction costs. 
In Table 12 (p. 95) and in Figure 6 (p. 96), the 
distribution of the implied hedge returns on the Nikkei 225 
futures is presented. 43.26% of the sample days had 
implied hedge returns below zero. About 50% of the implied 
94 
Table 12 
Implied Hedge Returns Distribution 
Nikkei 225 Futures. 
9/3/1986 - 7/31/1987 
Frea. Interval Frea 9" Cumulative 'o 
< -30% 6 2.79% 2.79% 
-30%, -20% 4 1.86% 4.65% 
-20%, -10% 36 16.74% 21.40% 
-10%, -5% 21 9.77% 31.16% 
-5%, 0% 26 12.09% 43.26% 
0%, 5% 54 25.12% 68.37% 
5%, 10% 54 25.12% 93.49% 
10%, 15% 13 6.05% 99.53% 
15%, 20% 1 0.47% 100.00% 
Max. 
Min. 
Mean 
Std. Dev. 
# of Obs. 
16 
-33 
-16 
10 
14% 
85% 
10% 
38% 
215 
Summary of Implied Hedge Return Cumulative Frequency 
<20% 
4.65% 
<10% 
21.40% 
<0% 
43.26% 
>10% 
6.52% 
>15% 
0.47% 
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hedge returns fell into the range of 0% and 10%. 
Considering the average risk-free rate for the period to be 
4.13%, the futures prices were sometimes outside of the 
arbitrage-free zone (Figure 7, p. 98). The frequent 
occurrences of negative implied hedge returns suggest that 
the Nikkei 225 futures prices were not aligned with the 
spot prices. 
The distributions of the mispricing and of the implied 
hedge returns may suggest that either arbitrage did not 
work very well in these markets, or the cost-of-carry model 
was not the valuation model used in the marketplace. The 
persistence of excess implied hedge returns, defined as the 
difference between the implied hedge returns and the risk¬ 
free rates may also suggest the possibility that the 
arbitrage-free boundary is much wider than it is in the 
U.S. An increasingly widening of the range of mispricing 
may further suggest that some other impediments have 
hindered the efficacy of the arbitrage, even after 
accounting for the transaction costs. 
5.2.2. Hang Sena Index 
While the Nikkei 225 futures contract had been under¬ 
valued, the Hang Seng Index futures had been overvalued for 
most days of the period examined. Table 13 (p. 99) and 
Figure 8 (p. 100) present the level and frequency of 
mispricing. More than 87% of the mispricing was positive. 
Mispricing greater than 2% accounts for nearly 32% of all 
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Table 13 
Distribution of Mispricing: 
Hang Seng Index Futures. 
5/6/1986 - 7/31/1987 
Free. Interval Frea. % Cumulative % 
< -1.0% 1 0.33 0 . 33 
-1.0%, 0.0% 36 11.84 12.17 
0.0%, 0.5% 42 13.82 25.99 
0.5%, 1.0% 44 14.47 40.46 
1.0%, 1.5% 43 14.14 54.61 
1.5%, 2.0% 41 13.49 68.09 
2.0%, 2.5% 38 12.50 80.59 
2.5%, 3.0% 21 6.91 87.50 
3.0%, 3 . 5% 27 8.88 96.38 
3.5%, 4.0% 8 2.63 99.01 
4.0%, 4.5% 3 0.99 100 . 00 
Max. 4.31% 
Min. -1.12% 
Mean 1.41% 
Std. Dev. 1. 16% 
# of Obs . 304 
Summary of Mispricing Cumulative Frequency 
<-l% <0% >1% >2% 
0.33% 12.17% 59.54% 31.91% 
HANG SENG FUTURES MISPRICING 
DISTRIBUTION (3/8/1936 - 7/31/1987) 
-1.0 0.0 0.3 1.0 1.3 2.0 2.3 3.0 3.3 4.0 4.3 
MISPRICING AS IS OF SPOT INDEX 
Figure 8 Distribution of Hang Seng Index 
Futures Mispricing. 
sample days. The mispricing fell between -1.12% and 4.32% 
of the spot index. The range (5.44%) is a little tighter 
than that of the Nikkei 225 (6.55%), but still a lot wider 
than that of the S&P 500 (1.71%). On average, the Hang 
Seng Index futures were overvalued by 33.12 points, or 
I. 41% of the spot index with a standard deviation of 1.16%. 
Extreme mispricing did happen frequently. The total 
cases of mispricing which exceeded 3% of the spot index 
account for 19.41% of the sample days. Mispricing seems to 
get narrower over time which parallels the early behavior 
of the S&P 500 futures (Figure 9, p. 102). The futures 
mispricing of Hang Seng by contract and the summary 
statistics of the futures mispricing by contract are 
presented in Tables 14 and 15 (pp. 103-4). In contrast to 
the futures mispricing of the Nikkei 225, the Hang Seng 
futures had been consistently overvalued since its 
inception in May 1986. 
For the corresponding period, the S&P 500 futures 
displayed a narrower range of mispricing, only 1.71% (Table 
16, p. 105 and Figure 10, p. 106). It ranged from -1.17% 
to 0.54%. On average, the mispricing was only 0.025% of 
the spot index with a standard deviation of 0.29%. There 
is only a 0.32% of negative mispricing of greater than 1% 
of the spot index. For positive mispricing, only 5% of 
mispricing is greater than 0.5% of the spot index (Figure 
II, p. 107) . 
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Table 14 
Hang Seng Futures Mispricing 
(By Contract). 
5/6/1986 - 7/31/1987 
Freer. Interval 6/86 
Contract Months 
7/86 8/86 9/86 10/86 
< -1.0% 0 0 0 0 1 
-1.0%, 0 . 0% 0 0 3 1 10 
0.0%, 0 . 5% 0 0 4 5 4 
0.5%, 1.0% 1 5 2 6 3 
1.0%, 1.5% 4 6 4 7 2 
1.5%, 2.0% 4 5 4 1 1 
2.0%, 2.5% 7 3 5 0 0 
2.5%, 3.0% 3 0 1 0 0 
3.0%, 3 . 5% 0 0 0 0 0 
3.5%, 4.0% 0 0 0 0 0 
4.0%, 4.5% 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 19 19 23 20 21 
Freer. Interval 11/86 
Contract Months 
12/86 1/87 2/87 3/87 
< -1.0% 0 0 0 0 0 
-1.0%, 0.0% 0 0 0 0 0 
0.0%, 0 . 5% 1 0 0 0 0 
0.5%, 1.0% 0 0 0 1 2 
1.0%, 1. 5% 1 0 0 1 6 
1.5%, 2.0% 1 3 1 4 8 
2.0%, 2.5% 4 5 2 8 2 
2.5%, 3.0% 6 2 2 0 
i 
3.0%, 3 . 5% 8 6 8 3 1 
3.5%, 4.0% 0 3 3 1 0 
4.0%, 4.5% 0 1 2 0 0 
Total 21 20 18 18 20 
Contract Months 
Free. Interval 4/87 5/87 
<-1.0% 0 0 
-1.0%, 0.0% 0 1 
0.0%, 0.5% 0 3 
0.5%, 1.0% 2 6 
1.0%, 1.5% 6 4 
1.5%, 2.0% 5 4 
2.0%, 2.5% 1 1 
2.5%, 3.0% 6 0 
3.0%, 3.5% 1 0 
3.5%, 4.0% 1 0 
4.0%, 4.5% 0 0 
Total 22 19 
6/87 
0 
8 
8 
5 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
21 
7/87 
0 
10 
10 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
20 
8/87 
0 
3 
7 
11 
2 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
23 
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Table 15 
Hang Seng Futures Mispricing: 
Summary Statistics. 
5/6/1986 - 7/31/1987 
Contract Months 
6/86 7/86 8/86 9/86 10/86 
# of Obs. 19 19 23 20 21 
Min 0.96% 0.72% -0.25% -0.19% -1.12% 
Max 2.66% 2.24% 2.70% 1.68% 1.57% 
Mean 1.90% 1.40% 1.19% 0.82% 0.15% 
Std. Dev. 0.51% 0.47% 0.93% 0.46% 0.74% 
Contract 1 Honths 
11/86 12/86 1/87 2/87 3/87 
# of Obs. 21 20 18 18 20 
Min 0 . 16% 1.84% 1.65% 0.60% 0.88% 
Max 3 . 30% 4.31% 4.29% 3.87% 3.23% 
Mean 2.59% 2.86% 3.20% 2.21% 1.65% 
Std. Dev. 0.76% 0.72% 0.68% 0.7 8% 0.59% 
Contract Months 
4/87 5/87 6/87 7/87 8/87 
# of Obs. 22 19 21 20 23 
Min 0.51% -0.09% -0.38% -0.43% -0.48% 
Max 3.55% 2.30% 0.99% 0.39% 1.23% 
Mean 1.97% 1.04% 0.20% 0.00% 0.47% 
Std. Dev. 0.85% 0.64% 0.38% 0.25% 0.42% 
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Table 16 
Distribution of Mispricing: 
S&P 500 Index Futures. 
5/6/86-7/31/87 
Freer. Interval Free. % Cumulative % 
< -1.00% 1 0 . 32 0.32 
-1.00%, -0.50% 19 6.05 6.37 
-0.50%, -0.40% 14 4.46 10.83 
-0.40%, -0.30% 11 3 . 50 14.33 
-0.30%, -0.25% 6 1.91 16.24 
-0.25%, -0.20% 10 3 . 18 19.43 
-0.20%, -0.10% 19 6.05 25.48 
-0.10%, -0.05% 16 5 . 10 30.57 
-0.05%, 0 . 00% 21 6.69 37.26 
0.00%, 0 .05% 20 6 . 37 43.63 
0.05%, 0 . 10% 25 7.96 51. 59 
0.10%, 0.20% 59 18.79 70.38 
0.20%, 0.25% 20 6.37 76.75 
0.25%, 0 . 30% 30 9.55 86.31 
0.30%, 0.40% 27 8.60 94.90 
0.40%, 0 . 50% 11 3 . 50 98.41 
0.50%, 0 . 55% 5 1.59 100.00 
Max. 0.54% 
Min. -1.17% 
Mean 0.025% 
Std. dev. 0.295% 
# of Obs. 314 
Summary of Mispricing Cumulative Frequency 
<-l% <0% >0.1% >0.5% 
0.43% 34.63% 49.35% 2.16% 
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The distribution of the implied hedge returns for the 
Hang Seng Index is presented in Table 17 (p. 109). The 
average implied hedge returns for the period was over 16.8% 
for the Hang Seng Index futures contract with a standard 
deviation of 9.18% compared to the average risk-free rate 
of 2.97% (Figure 12, p. 110). Implied hedge returns 
greater than 20% were common. With a transaction cost of 
1.4%, the excess implied hedge return was still 
significantly large. 
Several reasons can be offered to explain the existence 
of mispricing, or violation of the arbitrage condition in 
the Nikkei 225 and the Hang Seng futures markets. First, 
as mentioned in section 3.1.3.2, non-synchronous reporting 
of data may be the cause of price discrepancy. Precautions 
have been taken to minimize the effect of non-synchr nous 
reporting of data. For the case of the Hang Seng Index 
futures, this possibility had been minimized by using a 
synchronous data set of spot and futures prices as of the 
close of the spot market at 3:30 P.M. to valuate the 
futures contract. For the Nikkei 225 futures, these short¬ 
term aberrations due to measurement errors, are small and 
unlikely to be systematic. Brenner et al. [26] compared 
the results from a synchronous data set of prices as at the 
closing of the Nikkei 225 spot market with the results from 
the closing prices of the futures market. They found that 
results were similar. 
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Table 17 
Implied Hedge Returns Distribution: 
Hang Seng Index Futures. 
5/6/1986 - 7/31/1987 
Freg. Interval Freq. % Cumulative % 
< -5% 1 0 . 33% 0.33% 
-5%, -1% 1 0 . 33% 0.66% 
-1%, 0% 1 0 . 33% 0.99% 
0%, 1% 1 0 . 33% 1.32% 
1%, 5% 26 8.55% 9.87% 
5%, 10% 48 15.79% 25.66% 
10%, 15% 62 20.39% 46.05% 
15%, 20% 45 14.80% 60.86% 
20%, 25% 62 20.39% 81.25% 
25%, 30% 29 9.54% 90.79% 
30%, 35% 19 6.25% 97.04% 
35%, 40% 6 1.97% 99.01% 
40%, 50% 3 0.99% 100.00% 
Max. 
Min. 
Mean 
Std. Dev. 
# of obs. 
42.34% 
-6.70% 
16.87% 
9. 18% 
304 
Summary of Implied Hedge Returns Cumulative Frequency 
<0% >0% >10% >20% >30% 
0.99% 99.01% 74.34% 39.14% 9.21% 
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Moreover, persistence of mispricing and the great 
magnitude of mispricing in both directions rule out the 
possibility of the measurement error problem due to non- 
synchronous trading and reporting of data. Furthermore, 
for the Nikkei 225 futures, the day following the days on 
which either the Tokyo Stock Exchange or the Singapore 
International Monetary Exchange (SIMEX) is closed are 
deleted from the sample. Thus, the probable measurement 
error is further reduced. 
Second, institutional impediments may discourage 
arbitrageurs to operate in these markets. Short-selling is 
prohibited in both Hong Kong and Tokyo stock markets. 
Thus, arbitrageurs may not be able to arbitrage freely 
according to the cash-and-carry model of arbitrage in these 
markets as opportunities arise. Moreover, the Nikkei 225 
futures contract is not traded in Tokyo as is the Index. 
It is traded on the SIMEX. There are basically no 
investment barriers in Singapore, but foreigners cannot 
easily trade in the Tokyo Stock Exchange. The legal and 
physical separation of the two markets increase the 
transaction costs of arbitrage, and thus allowing a wider 
band of arbitrage-free price differentials. Nevertheless, 
the mispricing is too big to be explained by the 
transaction costs in the Japanese and Hong Kong markets. 
Third, the clustering of dividends may be a possible 
explanation for the mispricing of futures. For instance, 
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in Japan, two-third of the dividends are paid in March and 
September. However, the mispricing had been persistent, 
and the size was significant. Therefore, the distribution 
of dividends might not be the major cause for mispricing. 
Moreover, it usually takes 2-3 weeks to get the dividends 
in Japan. For the period studied, the dividend yield for 
Nikkei 225 was approximately 0.3%. The annual dividend 
yield is so small that traders may forgo dividends and 
value the futures without dividends. 
5.3 Relationship between Changes in Futures Mispricing and 
Index Changes 
As pointed out in section 5.1, the futures prices tend 
to lead the spot prices in rapidly moving markets, and 
volatility of mispricing is one source of volatility. This 
is because the futures market can digest the new 
information or a change of market sentiment more quickly 
than a broad based spot index market via the arbitrage 
mechanism. On a day with large index move, high volatility 
may induce a higher level of futures mispricing. One would 
expect to see a positive, contemporaneous relationship 
between mispricing changes and index returns when 
mispricing reaches a level that induces arbitrage. Hill et 
al. [61] have documented evidence that such a relationship 
existed for the S&P 500 futures for the period June 1983- 
August 1986.45 
This section analyzes the relationship between the daily 
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percentage changes in index levels and changes in 
mispricing in the Nikkei 225 and the Hang Seng futures 
contracts, and its implications on the costs of portfolio 
insurance. A negative and significant correlation between 
the daily percentage changes in index levels and changes in 
mispricing implies that positive (negative) index returns 
tend to be followed by a decrease (increase) in futures 
mispricing. If the negative correlation happens for the 
next day index returns, it could then be interpreted as an 
opportunity to reduce the cost of portfolio insurance (Hill 
et al. [61]). The portfolio insurance cost can be reduced 
by postponing the trading of futures contracts by one day 
such that the futures can be bought cheaper or sold at a 
higher price. However, if the mispricing of futures of the 
day following a day of large index return move does not 
exceed its average size, waiting another day may cost more 
to the portfolio insurers because of increased tracking 
errors of the insurance program. 
In Table 18 (p. 114), the contemporaneous, one-day lead, 
and one-day lag relationships between the Nikkei 225 and 
its futures contracts are shown for the entire data set, 
and for index changes of amounts greater than .5%, 1.0%, 
1.5%, and 2.35% in absolute value. These values represent 
a move of index value greater than the average index move 
(0.11%) over the same period. A change of 1.17% represents 
one unit of standard deviation of daily index percentage 
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Table 18 
Correlation Between Changes in Futures Mispricing 
and Daily Index Percentage Changes: 
Nikkei 225. 
9/3/1986 - 7/31/1987 
Day of mispricing 
in relation Index Changes 
to Index Chancre Entire >0.5% >1.0% >1.5% >2.35% 
Previous Day -.0231 
(214) 
-.0149 
(136) 
. 0010 
(74) 
-.1689 
(33) 
. 2492 
(14) 
Same Day -.0966 
(215) 
-.0949 
(136) 
-. 1249 
(74) 
-.1207 
(33) 
-.3439 
(14) 
Next Day . 0497 
(214) 
. 0696 
(136) 
. 0664 
(74) 
. 1086 
(33) 
-.0021 
(14) 
Std. Dev. of 
Mispricing Changes 
(Same Day) . 7211 . 8204 . 8929 .9122 . 8589 
Percentage of Obs. 63.25 34.41 15.34 6.51 
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changes. Therefore, a 2.35% index change represents a move 
of 2 standard deviations, or over 98% of the normal 
distribution. 
In our sample, 6.51% of the futures mispricing are 
associated with index move of greater than 2.35%. The 
contemporaneous correlation for this subsample is -.34 with 
a standard deviation of mispricing changes of .85%. The 
contemporaneous correlations between the futures mispricing 
and other index changes are all negative, but the 
magnitudes are not as big as it is for a large index 
change. The next day correlations are all positive except 
for extreme index changes, while the previous day 
correlations are mixed. For the entire sample, the 
previous day correlation is negative due to the frequent 
negative correlations for index changes of greater than 
0.5%. No correlations are statistically significant in the 
entire data set and its subsamples. 
In Table 19 (p. 116), results for the S&P 500 for the 
same period are presented in the same format, except that 
the index changes are for amounts greater than .5%, 1%, 
1.5%, and 1.96%. Results of these data sets are very 
different. For the S&P 500, the contemporaneous 
relationships are positive and significant at .05 level 
across all samples, while the one-day lag relationships are 
all negative and significant. For extreme index changes, 
such as those changes with greater than 1.96% (i.e., 2 
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Table 19 
Correlation Between Changes in Futures Mispricing 
and Daily Index Percentage Changes: 
S&P 500. 
9/3/1986 - 7/31/1987 
Day of mispricing 
in relation Index Changes 
to Index Chance Entire >0.5% >1.0% >1.5% >1.96% 
Previous Day . 1093 
(229) 
. 1582 
(114) 
. 1681 
(55) 
. 3823 
(28) 
.5133 
(16) 
Same Day .3108* 
(230) 
. 3499* 
(115) 
.4866* 
(56) 
.4472* 
(28) 
.4614 
(16) 
Next Day -.1918* 
(229) 
-.2759* 
(115) 
-.3194* 
(56) 
-.3593* 
(28) 
-.5347 
(16) 
Std. Dev. of 
Mispricing Changes 
(Same Day) . 2888 . 3398 . 3731 . 3851 .4307 
Percentage of Obs. 50 . 00 24.34 12.17 6.95 
* Significant at .05 level 
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standard deviations), they have the greatest and 
significant correlations with the changes in futures 
mispricing. The significant and negative correlations 
between the index move and the futures mispricing are also 
documented in this sample. The correlations increase as 
the index percentage moves get larger, except the one for 
the same day for 1.5% index move. 
The results for the Hang Seng Index and for the S&P 500 
futures for the corresponding period are reported in Tables 
20 and 21 (pp. 118-9). Similar to the results for the 
Nikkei 225, the contemporaneous correlations between 
changes in Hang Seng Index futures mispricing and daily 
index changes are all negative, but significant for the 
entire sample and subsamples (Table 20, p. 118). The 
correlations are stronger with the larger daily index 
change. With daily index change of greater than 2.3% (2 
standard deviations), the correlation with futures 
mispricing was -.6304. The next day correlations are 
greater, and increase with the magnitude of the daily index 
change. The previous day correlations are positive, but 
relatively weak and insignificant. 
These results are also in big contrast to the S&P 500 
for the same period. As shown in Table 21 (p. 119), there 
are strong and significant correlations between the daily 
index change at all levels and the changes in S&P 500 
futures mispricing, except for the one for >1.0% for the 
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Table 20 
Correlation Between Changes in Futures Mispricing 
and Daily Index Percentage Changes: 
Hang Seng. 
5/6/1986 - 7/31/1987 
Day of mispricing 
in relation Index Changes 
to Index Chance Entire >0.5% >1.0% >1.5% >2.30% 
Previous Day . 0771 
( 302) 
.0853 
(197) 
. 1247 
(118) 
. 1564 
(50) 
.0181 
(17) 
Same Day -.2701* 
(303) 
-.3325* 
(197) 
-.3797* 
(118) 
-.4480* 
(50) 
-.6304 
(17) 
Next Day . 0943 
( 302) 
. 1149 
(196) 
. 1761 
(117) 
. 2793 
(49) 
. 3609 
(17) 
Std. Dev. of 
Mispricing Changes 
(Same Day) . 4823 .5142 .5305 . 5172 . 5081 
Percentage of Obs. 65.01 38.94 16.50 5.61 
* Significant at .05 level 
118 
Table 21 
Correlation Between Changes in Futures Mispricing 
and Daily Index Percentage Changes: 
S&P 500. 
5/6/1986 - 7/31/1987 
Day of mispricing 
in relation 
to Index Chancre Entire 
Previous Day . 1444* 
(312) 
Same Day . 2926* 
(313) 
Next Day -.2050 
(312) 
Std. Dev. of 
Mispricing Changes 
(Same Day) . 2845 
Percentage of Obs. 
Index Changes 
>0.5% >1.0% >1.5% 
.2014* 
(154) 
. 2165 
(73) 
.3819 
(38) 
. 3402* 
(154) 
. 4727* 
(73) 
.4324 
(38) 
-.2943* 
(154) 
-.3219* 
(73) 
-.3304 
(38) 
. 3290 . 3590 . 3812 
49.20 23.32 12.14 
* Significant at .05 level 
.93% 
5359* 
(20) 
4932* 
(20) 
5432* 
(20) 
4069 
6.38 
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previous day. The futures mispricing changes are 
positively correlated with the same day and previous index 
changes, and negatively correlated with the next day index 
changes. In addition, the greater the daily index change, 
the stronger the correlation between the index return 
change and the changes in futures mispricing. 
Therefore, for the Hang Seng Index, a large index move 
is likely to be followed by a big change in futures 
mispricing in the same day. However, the change in futures 
mispricing of the next day tends to be smaller. This 
relationship seems to be stronger in Hong Kong than in 
Japan. Thus, it may be advantageous to wait or postpone 
rebalancing until the next day. However, the contempo¬ 
raneous negative correlations and positive next day 
correlations suggest that portfolio insurance costs can be 
reduced, if the rebalancing is done the same day. 
Furthermore, this may also imply that sufficient large 
index moves will induce arbitrageurs to come in to the 
market, and force the futures prices to move in line with 
the spot prices. The increasing correlations of futures 
mispricing with large index moves in both the Hang Seng and 
Nikkei 225 markets also support the notion. The 
implication of this relationship on the cost of portfolio 
insurance is discussed in section 5.4.1. 
To further investigate the effect of the relationship 
between large index moves (i.e., great volatility) and 
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futures mispricing on the cost of portfolio insurance, we 
present the correlations of the futures mispricing 
subsequent to the day of large index return moves in Table 
22 (p. 122). 
For the Hang Seng Index futures, the mean futures prices 
closed higher the following day for both extreme index 
advances and declines. This, couples with the fact that 
the negative contemporaneous correlation between the index 
changes and future mispricing, supports the contention that 
portfolio insurance users should rebalance the portfolio in 
the same day, except when they are going to sell futures. 
That is, if the index went down at a large percentage, and 
thus the portfolio insurance strategies would demand an 
decrease in the holding of risky assets, more futures 
should be shorted the next day to reduce the exposure. 
Investors should wait until the next day to rebalance. On 
the other hand, if the index rises at a large percentage, 
more futures should be bought back according to portfolio 
insurance strategies. Then, one should not wait because of 
higher futures prices (also larger mispricing) subsequent 
to large index increase. 
For the Nikkei 225 futures, on average, the futures 
closed higher (lower) the following day for extreme index 
advances (declines). Therefore, for the Nikkei 225, the 
investors should not wait at all. For the same period, as 
it was for the Nikkei 225, the S&P 500 futures closed lower 
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Table 22 
Effect of Large Percentage Move in 
Index on Futures Prices on the Following Day. 
S&P 500 Nikkei 225 Hancr Sena S&P 500 
Positive Index 
Percentage Move >1.96% >2.35% >2.3% >1.93% 
Mean Futures 
Prices % Change -0.57% 2.35% 0.74% 0.44% 
# of Obs. 8 5 11 10 
Negative Index 
Percentage Move <-1.96% <-2.35% <-2.30% <1.93% 
Mean Futures 
Prices % Change -0.14% -2.81% 0.52% -0.98% 
# of Obs. 8 9 7 11 
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the following day for both extreme index advances and 
declines. This seems to be consistent with the conjecture 
that waiting for a day to rebalance may lower the costs of 
portfolio insurance. However, for the same period as the 
Hang Seng Index futures, the S&P 500 futures closed higher 
(0.44%) on average the following day when the extreme index 
moves happened, and lower (-0.98%) on days after the index 
declined. 
Finally, in Table 23 (p. 124), the first order serial 
correlations of daily mispricing changes up to 10-day lag 
are presented. The 1-day lag of all indices are negative. 
The correlations beyond 1-day lag are generally weak, 
except the case of the Hang Seng futures where the 
correlation of 2-day lag is actually greater than the 1-day 
lag. That is, mispricing may reverse itself on the 
following day. For the Nikkei 225 and S&P 500 futures, the 
mispricings seem to be independent. 
5.4 Costs of Alternative Portfolio Insurance Strategies 
5.4.1. Realized Costs of Portfolio Insurance 
As mentioned in section 4.3.2, the realized cost of 
dynamic portfolio insurance strategies can be measured by 
the returns of the strategies vis-a-vis the returns of the 
uninsured portfolio. The shortfall in returns represents 
the cost of portfolio insurance. Thus, the returns from 
alternatives portfolio insurance strategies form the basis 
for computing the realized costs of portfolio insurance. 
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Table 23 
Comparative Correlation of Daily Mispricing Changes. 
5/3/1986- 7/31/1987 5/6/1986- •7/31/1987 
Laa in Davs Nikkei 225 S&P 500 Hancr Sena S&P 500 
1 -.230 -.451 -. 102 -.426 
2 .081 .013 -. 112 -.023 
3 .013 -.066 -.046 -.028 
4 -.108 . 061 . 045 . 040 
5 -.018 -.061 -.022 -.058 
6 .013 . 066 -.030 . 006 
7 -. 118 -.025 -.058 -.004 
8 . 103 . 001 -.102 .039 
9 -.082 -.091 . 040 -.077 
10 - . 017 . 104 -.018 . 055 
# of Obs.* 214 229 302 312 
* Based on 1 day lag. 
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The parameters used in alternative portfolio insurance 
strategies are summarized in Table 24 (p. 126). In Tables 
25 and 26 (pp. 127-8), the returns from alternative 
portfolio insurance strategies with different parameters 
are reported. From these tables, the realized costs of 
portfolio insurance are computed. 
We then report the costs of alternative portfolio 
insurance strategies, namely the dynamic hedging, the CPPI 
and the put-protected strategy as discussed in Chapter 3 
for the period selected. The period covers the first day 
of trading of the stock index futures contract up to July 
31, 1987. This represents approximately 1 year of 
protection for the Hang Seng Index and the Nikkei 225. All 
costs are annualized and expressed as a percentage of the 
initial value of the portfolio.The results provide the 
actual costs incurred during that period had these 
portfolio insurance strategies been installed to protect an 
index portfolio. 
For the put-protected strategy, a put was assumed to be 
purchased outright as it were to exist in the market to 
protect the underlying portfolio at the beginning of the 
protection period. Two costs of portfolio insurance are 
reported under this strategy. One portfolio insurance cost 
was derived under the assumption that the value of the put 
was based on the expected volatility, and the other 
portfolio insurance cost assumeed that the put was valued 
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Table 24 
Summary of Parameters. 
Nikkei 225 Hang Sena S&P 500 
Starting date : 9-3-86 5-6-86 9-3-86/5-6-86 
Ending date : 7-31-87 7-31-87 7-31-87 
Number of trading 
days : 216 304 231/314 
Initial portfolio 
value : JY100 Mill. HK$ 100 Mill. US$100 Mill. 
Initial index 
value : 18,505.45 1,858.16 250.08 
Ending index 
value : 24,488 . 11 3,479.24 318.66 
Average dividend 
yield : 0 . 30% 5.62% 3 .51% 
Average risk-free 
rate : 4 . 13% 2.97% 5.47%/5.54% 
Forecast Volat. : 16.30% 19.80% 13.2%/11.6% 
Realized Volat. : 19.93% 18.21% 15.49%/15.19% 
Filter : 0,3,10% 0,3, 10% 0,3,10% 
For DH & PP onlv 
Strike price : 1,7580.18 1,765.25 237.57/225.37 
Floor : 
Market impact 
0 , -5% 0 , -5% 0 , -5% 
(one way) : 
Commission per 
futures contract 
6 ticks 6 ticks 4 ticks 
(one way) : 
For CPPI onlv 
JY2,500 HK$100 US$25 
Level of 
protection : 80,90% 80,90% 80,90% 
Multipliers : 3 . 5,2.5 , 1. 5 3.5,2.5 , 1. 5 3 . 5,2.5 , 1. 5 
7,5,3 7,5,3 7,5,3 
* DH - Dynamic hedging strategy 
PP - Put-protected strategy 
CPPI - Constant Proportion Portfolio Insurance Strategy 
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Table 25 
Returns(%) from Alternative Strategies: 
Floor =-5%. 
9/3/1986 - 7/31/1987 
S&P 500 Nikkei 225 
Filter 0% 3% 10% 0% 3% 10% 
Cost of P.I. : 
Dynamic Hedging 26.48 26.27 26.89 27.09 25.51 21.93 
CPPI(70%) 27.65 26.76 29.75 29.29 29.00 25.63 
CPPI(50%) 22.15 22.88 24.78 20.47 21.30 20.27 
CPPI(30%) 16.95 18.53 20.18 15.45 17.00 14.55 
Put-protected(Expected) 28.44 29.37 
Put-protected(Realized) 27.54 27.96 
Uninsured (Index only) 31.19 32.66 
(5/6/1986 - 7/31/1987) 
S&P 500 Hana Sena 
Filter 0% 3% 10% 0% 3% 10% 
Cost of P.I.: 
Dynamic Hedging 33.94 33.90 34.72 86. 16 85.80 84.78 
CPPI(70%) 37.63 37.88 38.24 91.88 93 . 14 91.94 
CPPI(50%) 29.29 30 . 11 32.76 71.44 73.37 73.89 
CPPI(30%) 22.52 24.15 27.76 38.08 38.46 40.06 
Put-protected(Expected) 36.93 83.75 
Put-protected(Realized) 35.26 84.86 
Uninsured (Index only) 39.60 97.66 
CPPI( ) - CPPI strategy with initial exposure level 
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Table 26 
Returns(%) from Alternative Strategies: 
Floor =0%. 
9/3/1986 - 7/31/1987 
S&P 500 Nikkei 225 
Filter 0% 3% 10% 0% 3% 10% 
Cost of P.I.: 
Dynamic Hedging 23.66 23.29 24.41 23.97 23.45 20.39 
CPPI(70%) 28.94 28.96 31.62 27.03 25.49 14.79 
CPPI(50%) 21.60 21.39 26.13 24.90 24.00 17.72 
CPPI(30%) 17.40 18.71 20.98 15 . 06 16.41 14.57 
Put-protected(Expected) 26.18 27.22 
Put-protected(Realized) 25.16 2 5.66 
Uninsured (Index only) 31.19 32.66 
(5/6/1986 - 7/31/1987) 
S&P 500 Hana Sena 
Filter 0% 3% 10% 0% 3% 10% 
Cost of P.I. : 
Dynamic Hedging 30.89 30.86 32.07 81.07 81.07 79.95 
CPPI(70%) 33.94 35.96 40.46 91.31 94.01 94.32 
CPPI(50%) 29.85 28.81 34.24 84.89 87.08 85.32 
CPPI(30%) 23.35 24.75 28.65 52.26 54.26 54.50 
Put-protected(Expected) 34.70 79.22 
Put-protected(Realized) 32.84 80.27 
Uninsured (Index only) 39.60 97.66 
* CPPI ( ) - CPPI strategy with initial exposure level 
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at the realized volatility. The cost from the first put 
provides an expected cost of a portfolio insurance strategy 
should there be an exchange traded option. The second put 
option indicates how much portfolio insurance cost given 
the realized market conditions. 
The results from the dynamic hedging strategy are 
reported for 2 floor levels: -5% and 0%. The nearby 
futures contracts are used to implement the dynamic hedging 
strategy. The futures contracts are rolled over, and 
rollover costs are included in the transaction cost. 
Results are also reported for 3 rebalance intervals: 0%, 
3%, and 10%. Whenever the market moves by a greater 
percentage than specified from the previous rebalance 
level, the portfolio is rebalanced. 
For the CPPI strategy, results are reported for 2 
initial exposure levels (corresponding to 3 multipliers) at 
3 rebalance intervals. A multiplier with a cushion implies 
a certain level of initial portfolio exposure. A 
multiplier of 7 and a cushion level of 10% will have an 
initial exposure of 70%, whereas a multiplier of 3.5 with a 
cushion of 20% will also have an initial exposure of 70%. 
The transaction costs used in the CPPI are comparable to 
those used in the dynamic hedging strategy, albeit in 
percentages. 
In the subsequent sections, we first discuss the 
expected costs of portfolio insurance. Then, we compare 
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and analyze the alternative portfolio insurance strategies 
results for the Hang Seng and the Nikkei 225 as against 
those for the S&P 500. 
5.4.1.1 Hang Seng Index 
The results for the -5% floor and 80% initial protection 
level are presented in Table 27 (p. 131). The expected 
cost of portfolio insurance was higher for the Hang Seng 
Index than the Nikkei 225's, as compared to the S&P 500's. 
Results from the previous sections suggest that the Hong 
Kong and Japanese markets are volatile, and extreme 
misalignments between the stock and futures markets are 
commonplace. These factors will lead to a higher expected 
cost of portfolio insurance in these countries than in the 
U.S. The expected cost for the Hang Seng Index (11.23%) is 
more than 5 times that of the S&P 500 (2.15%). The 
realized cost of portfolio insurance for the Hang Seng 
Index for the put-protected strategy was actually lower 
than expected for the volatility went down from the 
previous year. In contrast, the volatility in the S&P 500 
went up making portfolio insurance cost higher than 
expected in the U.S. Ex post cost of portfolio insurance 
for the Hang Seng Index is approximately 3 times of the S&P 
500's (10.33% vs. 3.50%). 
The cost of the dynamic hedging strategy had been able 
to match the portfolio insurance cost of the put-protected 
strategy. For rebalance intervals 0%, 3%, and 10%, the 
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Table 27 
Costs of Portfolio Insurance: 
Hang Seng and S&P 500. 
5/6/1986 - 7/31/1987 
S&P 500 Hang Sena 
Filter 0% 3% 10% 0% 3% 10% 
Cost of P.I.: 
Dynamic Hedging 4.73 4.67 3.97 9.84 9.86 10.60 
CPPI(70%) 1. 59 1.38 1.09 4.66 3.65 4.61 
CPPI(50%) 8.32 7.66 5 . 52 21.17 19.61 19.19 
CPPI(30%) 13.79 12.47 9.56 48.11 47.80 46.51 
Put-protected(Expected) 2. 15 11.23 
Put-protected(Realized) 3 . 50 10 .33 
Volatility 
Expected 11.60 19.80 
Realized 15 . 18 18.21 
Notes: 
1. All costs are annualized and expressed as percentages of 
the initial values of the portfolio. 
2. Volatilities are in percentages and based on the one- 
year returns immediately prior to the starting date of 
the program. 
3. Dynamic Hedging results are based on the following 
assumptions: 
a. Floor = -5% 
b. Market impact is 4 ticks for S&P 500; 6 ticks for 
Hang Seng. 
c. Commissions per futures contract are: $25 for S&P 
500; HK$100 for Hang Seng. 
4. CPPI results are based on the following assumptions: 
a. Level of Protection is 80% of the initial value. 
b. One way transaction cost including market impact is 
0.825% for S&P 500; and 1.4% for Hang Seng. 
c. Initial exposure is 70% with a multiplier of 3.5; 50% 
with 2.5 and 30% with 1.5. 
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costs were 9.84%, 8.86%, and 10.40%, respectively. One 
interesting point to note is that for the Hang Seng Index, 
even with high implementation costs, the zero rebalance 
interval (i.e., daily rebalancing) attained a lower cost 
than 3% or 10% rebalance intervals. This may be due to the 
fact that the market had been bullish. A less frequent 
rebalance interval will not be able to capture as much 
upside gains as the zero rebalance interval will. After 
transaction costs, the dynamic hedging strategy with a zero 
rebalance interval had a lower economic cost than the 
dynamic hedging strategy with a 3% or 10% rebalance 
interval, and the put-protected strategy. 
Another possible explanation for the better performance 
of the dynamic hedging strategy with zero rebalance 
interval is that the Hang Seng futures contracts had been 
overvalued. Since the dynamic hedging strategy requires 
shorting more futures contracts as the market declines and 
buying them back as the market rises, futures mispricing 
could be an additional cost or reduction in cost in 
portfolio insurance. Since the contemporaneous 
correlations of the Hang Seng index change and mispricing 
are negative (Table 20, p. 118), large positive index moves 
reduce mispricing; large negative index moves induce bigger 
changes in the mispricing of futures. Therefore, if the 
large up and down movements in the market are evenly 
distributed, the net effect is that the strategy will 
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receive a lower return from buying and selling of the 
futures. 
When the market moves up by a large percentage, the 
futures contracts are overvalued by a smaller amount. On 
the other hand, when the market declines by a large 
percentage, the futures contract will be mispriced even 
greater than before. If the portfolio is rebalanced 
infrequently, it ends up only buying futures at a "fairer" 
price when the index has gone up, and selling futures at a 
lower price when the index has plunged down. In contrast, 
a dynamic hedging strategy with frequent rebalancings will 
even out the cost of the futures. Consequently, on 
average, the cost of a dynamic hedging strategy at 10% 
rebalance interval will be higher than the strategy with an 
0% rebalance interval for the Hang Seng Index. 
It seems that the mispricing effect of the Hang Seng 
futures dominates the transaction cost effect, thereby 
making the cost of portfolio insurance higher for the 10% 
rebalance interval than for the 0% rebalance interval. 
This implication is indirectly borne out by the results of 
the CPPI. For the CPPI strategy, no futures contracts are 
used, and the cost decreases as the length of interval 
rebalance increases. 
In contrast, the S&P 500 was fairly priced, or the 
mispricing was of a negligible magnitude. The cost of 
dynamic hedging is more affected by the transaction costs 
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and its ability to pick up economic gains than by the 
futures mispricing. Thus, for the S&P 500 the cost of 
dynamic hedging increases as the rebalance interval gets 
smaller. For instance, the portfolio insurance cost was 
3.97% for 10% rebalance interval and 4.73% for zero 
rebalance interval. 
The results from the CPPI strategy are reported for 3 
multipliers. The reason is that the multiplier, or the 
initial exposure/cushion are arbitrarily set. The costs of 
portfolio insurance from the CPPI in Table 27 (p. 131) 
range from 1.09% to 13.79% depending on the rebalance 
interval and multiplier. With a low initial exposure (30%) 
in an up-market, the cost of portfolio insurance under the 
CPPI strategy was prohibitive in Hong Kong as well as in 
the U.S. It was as high as 13.79% for the S&P 500, and 
48.11% for the Hang Seng Index at 0% rebalance interval. 
Even at 10% rebalance interval, the cost is 3 times greater 
than expected both for the Hang Seng Index and the S&P 500. 
With zero rebalance interval, the cost of the CPPI is close 
to the realized cost of the put-protected strategy. With 
rebalance interval greater than zero and an initial 
exposure of 70%, the costs of the CPPI are less than 10%. 
By increasing the multiplier to 3.5, the CPPI strategy 
had been able to obtain the lowest cost for the Hang Seng 
Index as well as for the S&P 500. This is because a large 
multiplier allows the portfolio to be fully exposed to the 
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upward gains. In fact, the portfolio under the CPPI 
strategy was totally exposed and reached the 100% 
investment ceiling very soon in our tests. 
In Table 28 (p. 136), we report the result for the zero 
floor for the dynamic hedging and the put-protected 
strategies, and the result for an initial protection of 90% 
for the CPPI strategy. Raising the floor from -5% to zero 
and the initial protection from 80% to 90% provides more 
protection, and thus higher expected cost of insurance. By 
changing the floor to zero, the expected cost of a put 
increased by 84% to 3.96% for the S&P 500, and by 32% to 
14.89% for the Hang Seng Index. The realized cost of the 
dynamic hedging strategy increased by over 30% for the Hang 
Seng Index and over 45% for the S&P 500. 
For the CPPI strategy, some of the costs actually went 
down. For the S&P 500, the CPPI strategy at 10% rebalance 
interval with a multiplier of 3.5 actually outperformed the 
index by 0.70%. This is due to the fact that the market 
had been bullish, and that the CPPI strategy performs best 
in an up-market. By increasing the multiplier through 
raising the initial floor will achieve a higher return, and 
thus a lower cost. For example, the cost of portfolio 
insurance for the Hang Seng Index is 3.65% for 3% rebalance 
interval with initial exposure of 70%. Reducing the 
initial exposure to 50%, the cost of the CPPI strategy 
135 
Table 28 
Costs of Portfolio Insurance: 
Hang Seng and S&P 500. 
5/6/1986 - 7/31/1987 
S&P 500 Hang Sena 
Filter 0% 3% 10% 0% 3% 10% 
Cost of P.I.: 
Dynamic Hedging 7.04 7.06 6.08 13.40 13 . 39 14.30 
CPPI(70%) 3.88 2.93 -0.70 5 . 12 2.93 2.69 
CPPI(50%) 7.86 8.70 4.32 10 . 30 8.53 9.96 
CPPI(30%) 13. 11 11.98 8.83 36.65 35.04 34.84 
Put-protected(Expected) 3 . 96 14. 89 
Put-protected(Realized) 5 . 46 14. 04 
Volatility 
Expected 11.60 19.80 
Realized 15 . 18 18.21 
Notes: 
1. All costs are annualized and expressed as percentages of 
the initial values of the portfolio. 
2. Volatilities are in percentages and based on the one- 
year returns immediately prior to the starting date of 
the program. 
3. Negative costs indicate that the strategy outperforms 
the index. 
4. Dynamic Hedging results are based on the following 
assumptions: 
a. Floor = 0%. 
b. Market impact is 4 ticks for S&P 500; 6 ticks for 
Hang Seng. 
c. Commissions per contract are: $25 for S&P 500; HK$100 
for Hang Seng. 
5. CPPI results are based 
a. Level of protection 
value. 
b. One way transaction 
0.825% for S&P 500; 
c. Initial exposure is 
with 5 and 30% with 
on the following assumptions: 
is 90% of the initial portfolio 
cost including market impact is 
and 1.4% for Hang Seng. 
70% with a multiplier of 7; 50% 
3. 
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would be 19.61%, or 5 times of that of the 70% initial 
exposure. 
These results highlight the fact that if the multiplier 
was set high enough in anticipation of a bull market, the 
economic cost of portfolio insurance would be contained 
within a reasonable limit. Otherwise, the CPPI strategy 
would be expensive in providing downside protection. 
Moreover, frequent reversals of the market make the CPPI 
strategy very costly. Therefore, the cost of the CPPI 
strategy depends on the multiplier, and the initial 
exposure chosen which are selected on the expectation of 
the future trend of the market. This makes the estimation 
of the cost of the CPPI strategy difficult. 
5.4.1.2 Nikkei 225 
The costs of portfolio insurance for the Nikkei 225 and 
the S&P 500 are presented in Tables 29 and 30 (pp. 138-9). 
The portfolio insurance costs for the Nikkei 225 are more 
in line with the S&P 500 than the Hang Seng Index. 
Although the realized volatility was higher than expected, 
and it was also higher than that of the Hang Seng Index, 
the realized cost of the put protected strategy was 5.16% 
versus S&P 500's 4.01% for -5% floor. 
For the dynamic hedging strategy, the cost increases as 
the rebalance interval lengthens. This phenomenon is 
similar to what we have observed in the Hang Seng Index as 
reported in Tables 27 (p. 131) and 28 (p. 136). The 
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Table 29 
Costs of Portfolio Insurance: 
Nikkei 225 and S&P 500. 
9/3/1986 - 7/31/1987 
S&P 500 Nikkei 225 
Filter 0% 3% 10% 0% 3% 10% 
Cost of P.I.: 
Dynamic Hedging 5 . 36 5.49 4.77 6.50 8.13 12.00 
CPPI(70%) 3 . 89 4.87 1. 58 3.70 4.02 7.72 
CPPI(50%) 9.93 9 . 13 7.04 13.40 12.48 13.62 
CPPI(30%) 15 . 65 13.91 12.10 18.92 17.21 19.91 
Put-protected(Expected) 3 . 02 3.61 
Put-protected(Realized) 4.01 5 . 16 
Volatility 
Expected 13.20 16.30 
Realized 15.49 19.90 
Notes: 
1. All costs are annualized and expressed as percentages of 
the initial values of the portfolio. 
2. Volatilities are in percentages and based on one-year 
returns prior to the starting date of the program. 
3. Dynamic Hedging results are based on the following 
assumptions: 
a. Floor = -5%. 
b. Market Impact is 4 ticks for S&P 500; 6 ticks for 
Nikkei. 
c. Commissions per futures contract are: $25 for S&P 
500; Yen 2500 for Nikkei 225. 
4. CPPI results are based on the following assumptions: 
a. Level of protection is 80% of the initial value. 
b. One way transaction cost including market impact is 
0.825% for S&P 500; 1.24% for Nikkei 225. 
c. Initial exposure is 70% with a multiplier of 3.5; 50% 
with 2.5 and 30% with 1.5. 
138 
Table 30 
Costs of Portfolio Insurance: 
Nikkei 225 and S&P 500. 
9/3/1986 - 7/31/1987 
S&P 500 Nikkei 225 
Filter 0% 3% 10% 0% 3% 10% 
Cost of P.I.: 
Dynamic Hedging 8.28 8.69 7.45 9.55 10 . 12 13.49 
CPPI(70%) 2.47 2.44 -0.48 6.18 7.88 19.63 
CPPI(50%) 10 . 54 10.77 5 . 56 8.52 9 .51 16.42 
CPPI(30%) 15 . 15 13.71 11.22 19.34 17.86 19.87 
Put-protected(Expected) 5 .51% 5.97% 
Put-protected(Realized) 6. 63% 7.70% 
Volatility 
Expected 13.20 16.30 
Realized 15.49 19.90 
Notes: 
1. All costs are annualized and expressed as percentages of 
the initial values of the portfolio. 
2. Volatilities are in percentages and based on one-year 
returns prior to the starting date of the program. 
3. Negative costs indicate that the strategy outperforms 
the index. 
4. Dynamic Hedging results are based on the following 
assumptions: 
a. Floor = 0%. 
b. Market Impact is 4 ticks for S&P 500 
Nikkei. 
c. Commissions per futures contract are 
500; Yen 2500 for Nikkei 225. 
6 ticks for 
$25 for S&P 
CPPI results are based 
a. Level of protection 
b. One way transaction 
0.825% for S&P 500; 
c. Initial exposure is 
with 5 and 30% with 
on the following assumptions: 
is 90% of the initial value, 
cost including market impact is 
1.24% for Nikkei 225. 
70% with a multiplier of 7; 50% 
3. 
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contemporaneous correlations between the large Nikkei 225 
index moves and changes in futures mispricing are negative, 
though not significant (Table 18, p. 114). The only 
difference between the Hang Seng Index and the Nikkei 225 
in regard to the correlations between index changes and 
changes in futures mispricing is that on average, the 
futures closed higher (lower) on the following day 
subsequent to a large upward (downward) move in the Nikkei 
225 (Table 22, p. 122). Therefore, it would be cheaper to 
rebalance on the same day since the change in futures 
mispricing is smaller in the same day, and the futures 
prices are usually higher or lower than the average price 
movements. 
The cost of the dynamic hedging strategy increases from 
6.5% to 12% when the rebalance interval lengthens from 0% 
to 10%. Compared to the expected and the realized cost of 
the put-protected strategy, the dynamic hedging strategy 
did not perform that well. Even with a zero rebalance 
interval, the 6.5% cost is higher than the put-protected 
strategy's 5.16%. This might be due to the mispricing of 
the futures contract. For example, the differential 
between the realized costs of the put-protected and the 
dynamic hedging strategy is 1.34% (6.5%-5.16%) . This is 
within one standard deviation of futures mispricing. 
However, as the rebalance interval increases, the 
differentials get bigger; 2.97% for the 3% rebalance 
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interval, and 6.84% for the 10% rebalance interval. For 
the 3% and 10% rebalance intervals, the bigger rebalance 
intervals reflect the cumulative effect of the futures 
mispricing. 
The costs of the CPPI strategy with an initial exposure 
of 50% or 30% are high for all rebalance intervals. Only 
the CPPI strategy with a 70% initial exposure came close to 
the realized cost of the put-protected strategy. For the 
S&P 500, the cost is also lower for the initial exposure of 
70%. 
Increasing the floor return to zero, in general, raises 
the cost of portfolio insurance for the dynamic hedging 
strategy. However, this is not necessarily the case for 
the CPPI strategy. In Table 30 (p. 139), it can be seen 
that some of the costs of the CPPI strategy are 
significantly lower than their counterparts in Table 29 (p. 
138). For example, the costs of the CPPI strategy with 70% 
and 30% initial exposures are lower than the costs of those 
strategies with a floor of -5% for the S&P 500. For the 
Nikkei 225, the costs of the CPPI strategy with a 50% 
initial exposure for rebalance internals 0% and 3% are 
lower than their counterparts of a dynamic hedging strategy 
with a -5% floor. 
Besides the futures mispricing and the higher than 
expected volatility, the interest rate changes may have 
played a role in affecting the realized cost of portfolio 
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insurance. Usually, the higher the interest rates, the 
lower the portfolio insurance costs. 
The costs reported above, are indicative about the costs 
of portfolio insurance for the particular period examined. 
Since the investors are more concerned about the 
distribution of the costs, we have also looked at the 
distribution of the historical cost using simulated data. 
We report the results in the following section. 
5.4.2 Long-run Costs of Portfolio Insurance 
The long-run results for one-year programs for the 
Nikkei 225 are presented in Table 31 (p. 143). Over the 
188 cycle years, the average annual arithmetic mean return 
on the Nikkei 225 (with dividends reinvested) was 15.12%, 
with a standard deviation of 18.87%. The insured portfolio 
under dynamic hedging with a floor of -5% had a 12.05% 
return, with a standard deviation of 17.58%; the insured 
portfolio with the zero floor returned 10.74%, with a 
standard deviation of 16.74%. The 60/40 static mix 
portfolio had a return of 11.77% with a standard deviation 
of 11.04%, whereas the 90/10 static mix portfolio returned 
14.06%, with a standard deviation of 16.89%. The long-run 
average cost of portfolio insurance is computed by taking 
the difference between the long-run average return of the 
index portfolio (i.e., the uninsured portfolio) and the 
returns from the strategies. This represents the average 
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Table 31 
Long-run Costs of Portfolio Insurance: 
Nikkei 225. 
1-Year Program 
January 1971 - July 1987 
Index Dvnamic Hedaina Static Stratea 
FLOOR 
-5% 0% 60/40 90/10 
Std. Dev. 18.87 17.58 16.74 11.04 16.89 
Arith. Mean 15.12 12.05 10.74 11.77 14.06 
LRAC 3.07 4.38 3 .35 1.06 
# Years<Index 172 171 124 134 
Average 
Shortfall(%) 3.46 5.02 6.81 1.82 
# Years lndex^.0 
(160) 
Average Up-year 
Give-ups(%) 1.82 3 . 54 5.02 1.48 
# Years lndex<0 
(28) 
Average Down- 
year Excess(%) -0 . 33 0 .33 6.23 1.35 
Notes 
1. LRAC stands for long-run average cost. 
2. A negative number means loss for the strategy. 
3. Filter = 3%. 
4. Static strategies: 60/40 (90/10) means 60% (90%) of 
funds in risky assets and 40% (10%) in riskfree assets. 
143 
foregone return over the simulation period which 
encompasses both bull and bear periods. 
The long-run average cost of the dynamic hedging 
strategy with -5% floor and zero floor were 3.07% and 
4.38%, respectively. Compared to the static strategies, 
the dynamic hedging strategy with -5% floor would have 
dominated the 90/10 static mix strategy, but the 60/40 
static mix strategy would have dominated the dynamic 
hedging strategy with zero floor. 
In Table 32 (p. 145), the costs for the CPPI strategy 
with 2 multipliers and 3 rebalance intervals are given. 
The CPPI strategy with a multiplier of 3.5 outperformed the 
index at all rebalance intervals. The CPPI strategy with a 
multiplier of 2.5 and a 3% rebalance interval also beat the 
index; otherwise, the costs were less than 1.65%, and less 
than those of the dynamic hedging strategies. 
To provide additional information about how much 
portfolio insurance cost under different market 
environments, three more measures of cost are computed and 
reported. The average shortfall measures the amount of 
returns that the strategy falls short of the uninsured 
portfolio. The average shortfalls for the dynamic hedging 
strategy are 3.46% for the -5% floor and 5.02% for the zero 
floor. They are smaller than the shortfall of the 60/40 
static mix strategy (6.81%), but greater than the 90/10 
static mix strategy (1.82%) (Table 31, p. 143). The 
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Table 32 
Long-run Costs of Portfolio Insurance: 
Nikkei 225. 
1-Year Program 
January 1971 - July 1987 
Constant Prooortion Portfolio Ins . 
Index 
multiplier 
0% 3% 
-2 . 5 
10% 
multiplier 
0% 3% 
= 3 . 5 
10% 
Std. Dev. 18.87 11. 34 11.49 12.29 15.65 15.78 16.33 
Arith. Mean 15.12 16.76 16.22 15 .00 18.20 17.64 16.28 
LRAC 1.64 -1. 10 0 . 12 -3 . 08 -2.52 -1.16 
# Years<Index 76 79 81 47 54 67 
Average 
Shortfall(%) 6.71 6.78 6.77 2.38 2.44 2.55 
# Years Index^O 
(160) 
Average Up-year 
Give-ups(%) 0.66 1. 19 1.75 1.64 1.08 0.22 
# Years lndex<0 
(28) 
Average Down- 
year Excess(%) 14.85 14.23 9.20 11.29 10.75 6.52 
Notes 
1. LRAC stands for long-run average cost. 
2. A negative number means the strategy outperforms the 
index. 
145 
strategy which has an asset mix closer to the uninsured 
portfolio will have a smaller shortfall, especially in an 
up-market. Therefore, in our sample period, the 90/10 
static mix strategy should have the smallest shortfall. 
The average shortfall of the CPPI strategy depends on the 
multiplier and the rebalance interval chosen. 
For the Nikkei 225 with a multiplier of 2.5, the average 
shortfalls are above 6% compared to 5.02% of the dynamic 
hedging with 0% floor, and 1.82% of the 90/10 static mix 
strategy. But, they are lower than the shortfall of the 
60/40 static mix strategy (6.81%). With a multiplier of 
3.5, the CPPI strategy was able to reduce the average 
shortfall to less than 3% for all rebalance intervals. 
Again, this presents one of the problems of the CPPI 
strategy -- estimating the cost of the strategy is 
difficult. 
However, comparing the average shortfalls of two 
different strategies is not very meaningful. This is 
because the strategy with the higher average could, as an 
example, have a shortfall in only three years, while the 
other could have a shortfall in 18 years; in such a case, 
it may be difficult to determine which of the two is 
preferable. In comparing strategies, therefore, average 
up-year give-up is a more appropriate measure for the 
average for each strategy is taken over the same set of 
years. For the Nikkei 225, the dynamic hedging strategy 
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with zero floor gave up more than the dynamic hedging 
strategy with -5% floor for the extra protection (3.54% vs. 
1.82%). Likewise, the 60/40 static mix strategy gave up 
5.02% for it could not capture more upside gains as the 
market moved up. For the CPPI strategy with different 
rebalance intervals and multipliers, the up-side give-ups 
are all less than 1.75% (Table 32, p. 145). 
The down-year excess measures the extra return retained 
by the strategy when the market declines. For the Nikkei 
225, the dynamic hedging strategy with zero floor was able 
to retain some excess return in down-years, but not the 
strategy with -5% floor (Table 31, p. 143). Surprisingly, 
the CPPI strategy did very well in both up- and down- 
markets . 
In Tables 33 and 34 (pp. 148-9), long-run results for 1- 
year program for the Hang Seng Index are presented in the 
same format as Tables 31 (p. 143) and 32 (p. 145). The 
long-run average costs for the dynamic hedging strategies 
with -5% floor and zero floor are 7.64% and 9.09%, 
respectively (Table 33, p. 148). They are lower than the 
long-run average cost of the 60/40 static mix strategy 
(10.04%) but higher than the long-run cost of the 90/10 
asset mix strategy (5.63%). The long-run average costs for 
the dynamic hedging strategy for the Hang Seng Index are 
more than 2 times than the long-run average cost for the 
Nikkei 225. 
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Table 33 
Long-run Costs of Portfolio Insurance: 
Hang Seng Index. 
1-Year Program 
January 1971 - July 1987 
Index Dvnamic Hedcrincr Static Strateaies 
FLOOR 
-5% 0% 60/40 90/10 
Std. Dev. 52.03 40.64 38.88 30.80 46.34 
Arith. Mean 28.42 20.78 19 . 33 18.38 22.79 
LRAC 7.64 9.09 10 . 04 5.63 
# Years<Index 161 158 133 159 
Average 
Shortfall(%) 12.27 14.59 19.09 7.14 
# Years Index^O 
(137) 
Average Up-year 
Give-ups(%) 13.51 15.97 18.48 7.92 
# Years lndex<0 
(51) 
Average Down- 
year Excess(%) 8. 14 9.42 12.64 0 .53 
Notes 
1. LRAC stands for long-run average cost. 
2. Filter = 3%. 
3. Static strategies: 60/40 (90/10) means 60% (90%) of 
funds in risky assets and 40% (10%) in riskfree assets. 
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Table 34 
Long-run Costs of Portfolio Insurance: 
Hang Seng Index. 
1-Year Program 
January 1971 - July 1987 
Index 
Constant Proportion 
multiplier-2.5 
0% 3% 10% 
Portfolio 
multiplier 
0% 3% 
Ins. 
= 3 . 5 
10% 
Std. Dev. 52.03 34.90 35.01 34.87 44.68 44.73 44.55 
Arith. Mean 28.42 27.91 27.71 26.76 32.76 32.48 31.51 
LRAC 0 . 51 0.71 1.66 -4.34 -4.06 -3.09 
# Years<Index 111 113 121 95 101 111 
Average 
Shortfall(%) 14.52 14.44 14.36 5 . 18 5.18 5.97 
# Years lndex^.0 
(137) 
Average Up-year 
Give-ups(%) 11.06 11.24 12.26 2.79 3.07 4.16 
# Years lndex<0 
(51) 
Average Down- 
year Excess(%) 27.84 27.57 26.82 23.49 23.22 22.57 
Notes 
1. LRAC stands for long-run average cost. 
2. A negative number means the strategy outperforms the 
index. 
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The results for the CPPI strategy are similar to those 
of the Nikkei 225. The CPPI strategy had a lower long-run 
average cost than the dynamic hedging strategy. With a 
multiplier of 3.5, the CPPI strategy actually outperformed 
the index. The magnitudes of average shortfall, up-year 
give-up as well as the down-side excess are greater than 
those of the Nikkei 225. 
In Tables 35 and 36 (pp. 151-2) , the results for the S&P 
500 are presented. The long-run average cost for the 
dynamic hedging strategy with zero floor was 5.94%. By 
lowering the floor to -5%, the cost can be reduced to 4.4%. 
These long-run average costs of the dynamic hedging 
strategies are greater than either of the static 
strategies. The CPPI strategies outperformed the index. 
In terms of shortfall, the average shortfalls of the 
dynamic hedging strategies are much smaller than the 
shortfalls for the Hang Seng Index, but greater than those 
for the Nikkei 225 at both floor levels. For example, the 
shortfall for the dynamic hedging with a -5% floor is 5.63% 
versus 12.27% for the Hang Seng Index (Table 33, p. 148), 
and 3.46% for the Nikkei 225 (Table 31, p. 143). For the 
CPPI strategy with a mulitplier of 2.5, the average 
shortfall is below 5% (Table 36, p. 152), compared to over 
14% for the Hang Seng Index and over 6.7% for the Nikkei 
225. For the CPPI strategy with a multiplier of 3.5, the 
costs for the S&P 500 are higher than those for the Nikkei 
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Table 35 
Long-run Costs of Portfolio Insurance: 
S&P 500. 
1-Year Program 
January 1971 - July 1987 
Index Dynamic Hedging Static Strategies 
FLOOR 
-5% 0% 60/40 90/10 
Std. Dev. 16.32 13.85 12.44 9.77 14.42 
Arith. Mean 11.58 7.18 5.64 7.54 7.44 
LRAC 4.40 5.94 4.04 4.14 
# Years<Index 163 160 139 183 
Average 
Shortfall(%) 5.63 7.84 7.06 4.26 
# Years lndex^.0 
(144) 
Average Up-year 
Give-ups(%) 5.97 8.34 6.79 4.91 
# Years lndex<0 
(44) 
Average Down- 
year Excess(%) 0.74 1.95 5 .01 1. 56 
Notes 
1. LRAC stands for long-run average cost. 
2. Filter = 3%. 
3. Static strategies: 60/40 (90/10) means 60% (90%) of 
funds in risky assets and 40% (10%) in riskfree assets. 
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Table 36 
Long-run Costs of Portfolio Insurance: 
S&P 500. 
1-Year Program 
January 1971 - July 1987 
Constant Proportion Portfolio Ins. 
Index 
multiplier=2.5 
0% 3% 10% 
multiplier=3.5 
0% 3% 10% 
Std. Dev. 16.32 9.03 9 . 06 10 . 18 12.33 12.25 13.08 
Arith. Mean 11.58 15.36 14.79 13.01 16. 11 15 . 57 13.76 
LRAC -3.78 -3.21 -1.43 -4.53 -3.99 -2.18 
# Years<Index 74 80 83 148 141 114 
Average 
Shortfall(%) 4.46 4.58 4.94 6.29 5.98 4.72 
# Years lndex>0 
(144) 
Average Up-year 
Give-ups(%) -0 . 06 0.42 1.78 1.97 1.48 0.04 
# Years IndexCO 
(44) 
Average Down- 
year Excess(%) 15.94 15 . 12 11.97 12.91 12.20 9. 15 
Notes 
1. LRAC stands for long-run average cost. 
2. A negative number means the strategy outperforms the 
index. 
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225, and also for the Hang Seng Index, except for 10% 
rebalance interval. 
The average up-year give-ups for the dynamic hedging 
strategy for the S&P 500 are lower than those for the Hang 
Seng Index, but greater than those for the Nikkei 225. For 
the CPPI strategy, the upside give-ups for the S&P 500 with 
a multiplier of 2.5 and 3.5 are smaller than those for the 
Hang Seng Index and for the Nikkei 225, except the 10% 
rebalance interval. 
The average downside excesses for the S&P 500 for the 
dynamic hedging strategy are less than those for the Hang 
Seng Index but greater than those for the Nikkei 25. For 
the CPPI strategy, the downside excesses for the S&P 500 
are less than those for the Hang Seng Index but greater 
than those for the Nikkei 225. 
In Tables 37-42 (pp. 154-9), results for 3-year programs 
are reported. The annual cost of the 3-year program was, 
in general, lower than the 1-year program. For example, 
the 3-year long-run average cost for the dynamic hedging 
strategy with -5% floor was 1.65% for the Nikkei 225 (Table 
37, p. 154), where the 1-year long-run average cost was 
3.07%. For the Hang Seng Index, the long-run average cost 
of the 3-year program was 6.69% and 7.35% for -5% floor and 
zero floor, respectively (Table 39, p. 156), whereas the 
costs for the 1-year program were 7.64% and 9.09%. For the 
S&P 500, the costs of the dynamic hedging strategy for the 
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Table 37 
Long-run Costs of Portfolio Insurance: 
Nikkei 225. 
3-Year Program 
January 1971 - July 1987 
Index Dvnamic Hedaina Static Stratecries 
FLOOR 
-5% 0% 60/40 90/10 
Std. Dev. 10.28 9.45 9.25 6.09 9.21 
Arith. Mean 13.64 11.99 11.53 8.96 12.21 
LRAC 1.65 2. 11 4.68 1.43 
# Years<Index 164 164 145 155 
Average 
Shortfall(%) 1.65 2. 10 5.43 1.52 
# Years lndex>,0 
(154) 
Average Up-year 
Give-ups(%) 1.66 2.14 5. 10 1.53 
# Years lndex<0 
(10) 
Average Down- 
year Excess(%) -1.40 -1.44 1.77 0.22 
Notes 
1. LRAC stands for long-run average cost. 
2. A negative number means loss for the strategy. 
3. Filter = 3%. 
4. Static strategies: 60/40 (90/10) means 60% (90%) of 
funds in risky assets and 40% (10%) in riskfree assets. 
5. All returns and costs are annualized. 
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Table 38 
Long-run Costs of Portfolio Insurance: 
Nikkei 225. 
3-Year Program 
January 1971 - July 1987 
Constant Proportion Portfolio Ins. 
multipliers . 5 multipliers . 5 
Index 0% 3% 10% 0% 3% 10% 
Std. Dev. 10.28 6.04 6. 11 6. 53 8.52 8.49 9.00 
Arith. Mean 13.64 17.84 17.61 17 . 19 19.24 18.96 18.37 
LRAC -4.20 -3.97 -3 .55 -5.60 -5.32 -4.73 
# Years<Index 41 41 43 1 0 2 
Average 
Shortfall(%) 1.92 2.08 1.73 -5.05 0.59 
# Years lndex^.0 
(154) 
Average Up-year 
Give-ups(%) 3.41 3 . 18 2.76 5 .05 4.77 4.17 
# Years lndex<0 
(10) 
Average Down- 
year Excess(%) 16.27 15.99 15.60 13.98 13.74 13.23 
Notes 
1. LRAC stands for long-run average cost. 
2. A negative number means the strategy outperforms the 
index. 
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Table 39 
Long-run Costs of Portfolio Insurance: 
Hang Seng Index. 
3-Year Program 
January 1971 - July 1987 
Index Dvnamic Hedaina Static Stratea 
FLOOR 
-5% 0% 60/40 90/10 
Std. Dev. 30.10 26.70 26.04 17.27 26.04 
Arith. Mean 24.83 18 . 14 17.48 13 . 02 17.90 
LRAC 6.69 7 . 35 11.81 6.93 
# Years<Index 150 148 121 121 
Average 
Shortfall(%) 7.50 8.37 16.97 8.64 
# Years lndex>0 
(116) 
Average Up-year 
Give-ups(%) 8.75 9.77 17.66 8.83 
# Years IndexCO 
(48) 
Average Down- 
year Excess(%) -1.68 -1.48 2.35 2.32 
Notes 
1. LRAC stands for long-run average cost. 
2. A negative number means loss for the strategy. 
3. Filter = 3%. 
4. Static strategies: 60/40 (90/10) means 60% (90%) of 
funds in risky assets and 40% (10%) in riskfree assets. 
5. All returns and costs are annualized. 
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Table 40 
Long-run Costs of Portfolio Insurance: 
Hang Seng Index. 
3-Year Program 
January 1971 - July 1987 
Constant Procortion Portfolio Ins . 
Index 
multiplier 
0% 3% 
2.5 
10% 
multiplier 
0% 3% 
= 3.5 
10% 
Std. Dev. 30.10 21.05 21.10 20.69 27.25 27 . 15 27.10 
Arith. Mean 24.83 27.76 27.70 26.77 31.28 31. 11 30 . 02 
LRAC -2.93 -2.87 -1.94 -6.45 -6.28 -5. 19 
# Years<Index 164 89 89 39 41 42 
Average 
Shortfall(%) -2.93 7.58 8.93 9.63 9.26 11.64 
# Years Index^O 
(116) 
Average Up-year 
Give-ups(%) 4.17 4.23 5.25 -1.30 -1.09 0. 15 
# Years lndex<0 
(48) 
Average Down- 
year Excess(%) 20.13 20.03 19.34 18.89 18.80 18.11 
Notes 
1. LRAC stands for long-run average cost. 
2. A negative number means the strategy outperforms the 
index. 
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Table 41 
Long-run Costs of Portfolio Insurance: 
S&P 500. 
3-Year Program 
January 1971 - July 1987 
Index Dvnamic Hedaina Static Strateaie 
FLOOR 
-5% 0% 60/40 90/10 
Std. Dev. 9.85 10 . 07 9.72 5.79 8.38 
Arith. Mean 11.68 8 . 39 7.87 5. 10 6.35 
LRAC 3.29 3 . 81 6.58 5.33 
# Years<Index 160 159 153 164 
Average 
Shortfall(%) 3.40 3.98 7 . 13 5 . 32 
# Years Index^O 
(142) 
Average Up-year 
Give-ups(%) 3 . 52 4.19 7.64 5.81 
# Years lndex<0 
(22) 
Average Down- 
year Excess(%) 1.73 1. 34 -0.31 2.20 
Notes 
1. LRAC stands for long-run average cost. 
2. A negative number means loss for the strategy. 
3. Filter = 3%. 
4. Static strategies: 60/40 (90/10) means 60% (90%) of 
funds in risky assets and 40% (10%) in riskfree assets. 
5. All returns and costs are annualized. 
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Table 42 
Long-run Costs of Portfolio Insurance: 
S&P 500. 
3-Year Program 
January 1971 - July 1987 
Constant ProDortion Portfolio Ins. 
Index 
multipliers . 5 
0% 3% 10% 
multipliers . 5 
0% 3% 10% 
Std. Dev. 9.85 7.84 7.79 8.00 9.90 9.81 10.01 
Arith. Mean 11.68 17.45 17.26 16.06 17.80 17.63 16.53 
LRAC -5.77 -5 . 58 -4.38 -6. 12 -5.95 -4.85 
# Years<Index 12 12 19 2 4 8 
Average 
Shortfall(%) 1.28 1.24 1.62 0.91 0.58 1.91 
# Years index^O 
(142) 
Average Up-year 
Give-ups(%) -4.97 -4.76 -3.54 -5.64 -5.45 -4.36 
# Years lndex<0 
(22) 
Average Down- 
year Excess(%) 10.92 10.86 9.76 9.20 9.21 8.03 
Notes 
1. LRAC stands for long-run average cost. 
2. A negative number means the strategy outperforms the 
index. 
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3-year program were 3.29% for -5% floor and 3.81% for zero 
floor versus 4.40% and 5.94% for the 1-year program. It 
should be noted that it was more expensive to protect a 
short-term program than a long-term program in Japan than 
it was in the U.S. or in Hong Kong. 
The magnitudes of the average shortfall and the average 
up-year give-up are smaller than those of the 1-year 
program. This is consistent with Hill et al.'s [61] result 
that the cost of long-term programs are less volatile than 
those of the short-term programs. 
One result that stands out is the CPPI did better than 
expected. For a three-year program, the CPPI strategies 
outperformed the index in all three countries for all the 
multipliers and all the rebalance intervals chosen (Tables 
38, p. 155, 40, p. 157, and 42, p. 159). One possible 
explanation for this superior performance is that the 
simulations are based on the closing prices of the indices, 
which are serially correlated, and do not reflect truly 
obtainable prices. Simulations based on the closing prices 
will make portfolio insurance, especially the CPPI strategy 
looks better than it really is, because portfolio insurance 
strategies tend to buy in rising markets and sell in 
falling markets. 
5.5 Summary of Results 
The major empirical results from this study are: 
1. The Japanese and Hong Kong stock/futures markets have 
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been more volatile than the U.S. The expected cost of 
portfolio insurance will be higher in those countries. 
However, it does not necessarily mean that the realized 
cost of portfolio insurance in Japan or in Hong Kong will 
be higher than it is in the U.S. The realized cost of 
portfolio insurance depends on the realized volatility and 
the path of the market. 
2. Mispricing had been found in both the Hang Seng Index 
and the Nikkei 225 futures. Extreme futures mispricing 
existed frequently, and mispricing had been persistent. 
While the Hang Seng futures had been overvalued by 1.41% on 
average with a standard deviation of 1.16%, the Nikkei 225 
was undervalued by 0.76% with a standard deviation of 1.37% 
most of the time. 
3. Because of the negative correlations between large index 
moves and changes in futures mispricing, proper timing of 
the trading of futures can reduce the cost of portfolio 
insurance. It is advisable to rebalance the day following 
a large downward move in the market in Hong Kong, and to 
rebalance the same day for a large upward move if dynamic 
hedging strategy is used. Rebalancing should be done the 
same day in Japan and in the U.S., regardless of the 
direction of the index move. 
4. For the particular period tested in this study, the 
realized cost of dynamic hedging was not too prohibitive in 
either market, even with futures mispricing as compared 
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with the cost in the U.S. However, the realized cost of 
the CPPI strategy could be prohibitive, especially when the 
exposure was set too low in a bull market. 
5. Simulation results suggest that the cost of 1-year and 
3-year portfolio insurance programs in Japan and in Hong 
Kong are not prohibitive, given the probability of 
castastrophic plunges in the markets. The 3-year portfolio 
insurance programs cost less than the 1-year programs. 
Moreover, for the long-run simulations, the Constant 
Proportion Portfolio Insurance strategy outperformed the 
market for the periods examined. 
5.6 Generalizabilitv of Results 
The results from this study include an analysis on the 
costs of portfolio insurance based on a particular period 
selected as well as a historical back-testing simulation. 
The period selected does not include the Crash of October 
1987. This, however, does not affect the generalizability 
of the results of this study. 
This study has set out to focus on the comparative costs 
of alternative portfolio insurance strategies such that the 
extent of the usefulness of these strategies can be 
assessed in an international context. This study does not 
aim at assessing the cost of a particular strategy under 
certain market conditions. Therefore, it is important to 
compare the costs of alternative portfolio insurance 
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strategies under the market conditions where no strategy 
will dominate the others ex ante. 
A recent event provides an example. On October 19, 
1987, the stock markets and their futures markets around 
the world plummeted. The spot and futures markets were 
totally misaligned. At any point in time, the reported 
prices were not indicative of what the real supply and 
demand conditions were, and those prices were not 
obtainable for transactions. This event represents a 
violation of the basic assumption of the dynamic portfolio 
0 
insurance strategies, which is the assumption of continuous 
and uninterrupted trading in both the spot and futures 
markets. Under this scenario, the dynamic hedging strategy 
will underperform any strategies which do not utilize the 
futures, or both the futures and spot markets. Including 
this kind of scenario in our analysis will only distract 
our attention from our objective which aims at providing a 
reasonable estimate of the costs of alternative strategies 
under recurrent market conditions in the long run. 
Moreover, estimating the cost of the dynamic hedging 
strategy will become trivial when no trades can be assured 
to be executed in either the spot or the futures market at 
the quoted prices. The range of the cost of the dynamic 
hedging strategy has become unbounded. For these reasons, 
we have decided not to restrict ourselves to the worst case 
scenario. Furthermore, in our simulation, the 188 cycles 
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of 1-year returns and 164 cycles of 3-year returns based on 
the returns from 18 years have already provided a wide 
array of market conditions. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
The international financial markets have grown 400% in 
dollar volume during recent years, and international asset 
allocation will be one of the growing areas in 
international financial research in the next decade and 
beyond. One of the major concerns of international 
portfolio managers is the high volatility of foreign asset 
returns. Risk control techniques, such as currency 
hedging, and interest rates swaps have been designed and 
implemented to reduce the exposure to volatility risk. 
However, the conventional risk management techniques are 
symmetric risk-control techniques, i.e., they only provide 
a reduction of risk at the expense of reducing the 
probability of upward gain. Recently, portfolio insurance 
strategies show the feasibility of having the downside 
protection, while participating in upward gains in the U.S. 
financial markets. 
The success of domestic portfolio insurance strategies, 
however, may not indicate its benefits in international 
asset management. Foreign financial markets have different 
market structures which may not be suitable for the 
implementation of portfolio insurance strategies. This 
study has attempted to shed some light on the usefulness of 
alternative portfolio insurance strategies in international 
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asset management by establishing the facts about the market 
structures, discovering the differences among the markets, 
and analyzing the effects of different market structures on 
the implementation and the costs of portfolio insurance. 
The costs of some portfolio insurance strategies — 
option based as well as non-option based -- have been 
examined and analyzed. The empirical results show that 
although the market structures are different and volatile, 
the costs of portfolio insurance in those countries are not 
prohibitive. Portfolio insurance strategies can still be 
employed effectively in protecting a portfolio from 
downside risk at a reasonable cost. 
Specifically, the major findings from this research are: 
1. The Japanese and Hong Kong stock/futures markets have 
been more volatile than the U.S. However, it does not 
necessarily mean that the cost of portfolio insurance will 
be higher than it is in the U.S. It depends on the 
realized volatility and the path of the market. 
2. Mispricing had been found in both the Hang Seng and 
Nikkei 225 futures. Extreme futures mispricing existed 
frequently, and mispricing had been persistent. While the 
Hang Seng futures had been overvalued by 1.41% on average 
with a standard deviation of 1.16%, the Nikkei 225 futures 
were undervalued by 0.76% with a standard deviation of 
1.37% most of the time. 
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3. Because of the negative correlations between large index 
moves and changes in futures mispricing, proper timing of 
the trading of futures can reduce the cost of portfolio 
insurance. If the dynamic hedging strategy is used, it is 
advisable to rebalance the day following a large downward 
move in the market in Hong Kong, otherwise the same day. 
Rebalancings should be done the same day in Japan and in 
the U.S., regardless the direction of the index move. 
4. The realized cost of portfolio insurance is not 
prohibitive in both the Japanese and Hong Kong markets, 
even with futures mispricing. 
5. Simulation results suggest that the cost of 1-year and 
3-year portfolio insurance programs in Japan and in Hong 
Kong are not prohibitive, given the probability of 
catastrophic plunges in these markets. Moreover, for the 
long-run simulations, the Constant Proportion Portfolio 
Insurance strategy outperformed the market for the periods 
examined. 
The empirical findings from this research have 
established the facts about the market structures of the 
foreign financial markets and their impact on the 
implementation and costs of international portfolio 
insurance for future research. The results are also 
helpful to the U.S. investors who are contemplating 
investing abroad to decide whether portfolio insurance 
offers better risk control at an acceptable cost over the 
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transnational investments. In sum, the research findings 
from this study can serve as a guide to implementing 
international portfolio insurance in the countries studied 
with respect to various strategic decisions for researchers 
as well as for the aspiring international money managers. 
This study has established the necessary data on the 
market structures and the cost of portfolio insurance, 
which serve as the inputs to the optimization process. 
However, this study has presumed that the users of 
portfolio insurance strategies have some performance 
measurement frameworks to compare alternative investment 
strategies, including option strategies. Several 
approaches have been suggested, but none is well 
established yet. This should be the next item on the 
agenda for research. 
Another area of research related to portfolio insurance 
in an international context is in the currency risk 
management. It is possible to implement separate portfolio 
insurance programs on the assets and on the currencies 
simultaneously. This concept can also be extended to 
multiple asset classes. Research should be directed to 
testing of the feasibility of protecting multiple asset 
classes. 
Future research in portfolio insurance should also focus 
on the usefulness of the "gamma neutral hedging" -- option 
replication via options under turbulent market conditions. 
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However, for insuring portfolios in foreign countries, this 
may not be a viable approach until exchange traded options 
are available. 
Finally, the persistence of mispricing of futures 
contracts in Japan and in Hong Kong indicates that either 
these markets are not efficient, or the cost-of-carry model 
is not the appropriate valuation model. If the latter case 
is true, alternative valuation models are needed to explain 
the regularities in the pricing of futures in Japan and in 
Hong Kong. 
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ENDNOTES 
1. Portfolio insurance strategies can be categorized into 
option based and non-option based. 
2. In this study, we emphasize the application of portfolio 
insurance techniques in stocks, but the techniques are 
useful in other asset classes, such as foreign currencies 
and bonds. 
3. Asset allocation strategies coined as portfolio 
insurance are not true insurance in a strict sense. There 
is no third party guaranteeing the performance of the 
strategies. Therefore, it is possible that the value of 
the portfolio may fall below the floor at some time if the 
dynamic strategies do not replicate the insured portfolio 
perfectly. This is discussed later in section 3. 1.1.1. 
In this study, we refer to the creation of synthetic 
options by a dynamic trading process of asset allocation 
between a particular risky asset(s), and some particular 
riskless asset(s) which is used to define the minimum rate 
of return of the portfolio as portfolio insurance 
strategies. Since portfolio insurance strategies (the 
dynamic asset allocation strategy and the dynamic hedging 
strategy) involve option replication, option replication 
strategies and the constant proportion portfolio insurance 
strategy are all referred to as portfolio insurance 
strategies. 
4. This is estimated by Kidder, Peabody & Co., Inc. See 
"Buying and Selling in Futures and Options Markets." 
Futures, March 1987, p. 60. According to an industry 
survey by Intermarket, September 1987, pp. 26-39 as of July 
1987 there were 373 end-users of portfolio insurance 
accounting for more than 61 billion dollars. LOR, who had 
45 billion dollars under management in 1986, was not 
included in this figure. The major corporate plans were 
offered by LOR, Chase Investors, Aetna Life, Wells Fargo, 
J.P. Morgan, Bankers Trust, BEA, Oppenheimer, Advanced 
Investment, County Natwest, and Putnam. After the Crash of 
1987 the total amount of assets under portfolio insurance 
is estimated to be substantially lower than this figure. 
However, there is no reliable estimate published yet. 
5. See Commins, K. "Portfolio Insurance Goes Abroad." 
Intermarket. February 1987, p. 18. 
6. We use the term "put-protected portfolio" to mean 
"insured portfolio" and use the terms interchangeably. 
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7. Bookstaber and Langsam [16] argue that portfolio 
insurance strategies are not designed as a strategy to 
enhance total returns. Rather, it is a risk control tool 
which molds the payoff characteristics of a portfolio to 
meet objectives. It only provides insurance at a 
reasonable cost, and it cannot lead to a payoff that 
unambiguously dominates other strategies. 
8. Tilley and Latainer [121] have applied the multiple- 
risky-asset option formula on a weekly basis to implement 
an option replication strategy on T-bills, bond and equity 
over the 1973-1983 time period. Their results show that 
the option replication strategy produced superior 
performance while achieving the desired risk control. The 
strategy produced the minimum return in 3 out of 11 years. 
For 6 out of the 11 years, the strategy captured, on 
average, 78% of the return on e better performing risky 
assets. The compound performance of the synthetic option 
strategy appears to be quite stable over periods longer 
than one year. This is also supported by the results of 
forward-looking simulations. 
9. Here and thereafter, the reference asset/portfolio 
refers to the risky asset/portfolio that is to be insured. 
10. The degree of truncation depends on the residual error 
of the reference portfolio, time to expiration of the 
options, and whether the options are out-of-the-money. 
11. See Sharpe [114] for a good discussion on the 
relationship of the risk tolerance function and the 
portfolio insurance strategies. 
12. The coefficient of relative risk aversion is a measure 
of the investor's willingness to take risks of a given size 
relative to the investor's wealth level. A non-constant 
coefficient of relative risk aversion indicates that the 
investor's willingness to take risks varies with the wealth 
level. 
13. In portfolio insurance literature, the average investor 
is someone who do not insure his/her portfolio. 
14. A self-financing strategy refers to a strategy which 
does not require additional outside funds, or allow 
withdrawals of funds during the implementation of the 
strategy. 
15. Black and Hakanoglu [6] also showed that sellers of 
portfolio insurance could have realized capital gains every 
year from 1974-1986 in a simulation test. 
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16. For the discussion of the problems of skewness and the 
optimization of cubic utility function, see Kraus and 
Litzenberger [73], Schneeweis and Schweser [111], and Sears 
and Wei [113]. 
17. Simulations with expectations about probability 
distributions of asset returns will provide a more general 
result about the costs of portfolio insurance. 
18. Rendleman and McEnally [100] also found similar 
simulation results. 
19. This should be distinguished from a riskless hedge 
which would entail a constant change in delta to keep the 
position riskless with respect to the index changes. 
20. From Equation A4 in Appendix A, 
hi 
As T — >0, 
1) st = K. 
2) St > K. 
3) St < K. 
Also , it 
In(St/K) 
SD*T°•5 
r 
+ ( — 
SD 
T 0 . 5 ) + ( 0.5 * T 0.5 SD) 
we may differentiate among three cases 
In this case, h]_ -->0 as T -->0, 
and N(hi)=N(-h]_) —>0.5; 
In this case, h]_ --> infinity as T - 
and N(h]_) —>1, N(-h^) —>0; 
In this case, h]_ --> infinity as T - 
and N(hi)-->0, N(-h]_) -->1. 
->o, 
- > 0 , 
is well known in options literature that the 
value of an option decays over time, other things being 
equal. Black and Scholes [8] contend that option premiums 
are related to the square root of time rather than time 
itself, i.e., time decays at an accelerating rate. Theta 
measures the sensitivity of the option value to the change 
in time. The hedge has to be adjusted accordingly with the 
passage of time. The impact of time on option prices and 
its relationship with delta and gamma are discussed in 
Bookstaber and Putcha [18] and in Cox and Rubinstein [34], 
21. The delta and gamma of an option are analogous in 
concept to the duration and convexity of a bond. 
22. The two are equivalent because the arbitrageurs will 
ensure that the premium that the futures sell for is equal 
to the riskless rate less the present value of any 
dividends received for holding the underlying portfolio, 
otherwise arbitrage profits exist. 
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23. Fong and Tang [48] have pointed out that the choice of 
riskless asset is critical for the success of the portfolio 
insurance strategy, since the riskless asset is the 
instrument that provides downside protection. They have 
shown that using immunized bond portfolios as the riskless 
assets allows the investor to have strong control over the 
reinvestment risk in a dynamically hedge portfolio. 
Moreover, the use of immunized bond portfolios in other 
portfolio insurance contexts (e.g., return ceiling, 
multiple assets and surplus protection) is more superior 
than using just the Treasury bills. 
24. This can be viewed as an American option since the 
position can be liquidated any time prior to the end of the 
protection period. 
25. In fact, path independence is a necessary condition for 
utility maximization (Cox and Leland [31]). 
26. An example of the effect of a value change on a 
portfolio having the same delta but not the gamma can be 
found in Figlewski [44]. 
27. It is noted that the option replication via options is 
also one kind of dynamic option replication strategies, 
though rebalancing is done less frequently than the dynamic 
hedging and the dynamic asset allocation. In this study, 
we limit the use of the term "dynamic option replication 
strategies" to refer to the dynamic asset allocation and 
the dynamic hedging as described in section 3.1.1. 
28. The "gamma neutral hedging" is no more than a quadratic 
programming problem with inequalities constraints. Also, 
see Hill and Wood [67]. 
29. As at October 16, 1987, 
Portfolio value = $100 million 
S&P 500 = 282.70 
Dec 260 S&P put = 3 5/8. 
The computation is as follows: 
(1) The number of options = Required gamma/gamma of Dec 260 
S&P 500 put 
= 1,626/0.00845 
= 192,400 or 1,924 contracts 
(2) Number of shares = Required delta - delta of 
put-protected portfolio 
= 285,257 - (-37,074) 
- 322,331 
173 
(3) Cash 100,000,000 -(192,400*3.625+ 
322,331*282.70) 
8,179,576 
30. In CPPI programs, volatility is not an input. But high 
ex post volatility increases the frequency of trading and, 
therefore, the transaction costs. 
31. Rubinstein [108], Bookstaber [9], Bookstaber and 
Langsam [16], and Dybvig [37] have also reviewed the stop- 
loss orders as a decision rule of portfolio insurance 
strategy, which is a path-dependent strategy. Brennen and 
Schwartz [22] have recently put forward the time-invariant 
portfolio insurance strategies while Leland O'Brien 
Rubinstein (LOR) has also suggested a proprietary version 
of portfolio insurance called "Perpetual Protection 
Policies" which is claimed to be time invariant as well as 
having other desirable characteristics. 
32. For the hedging effectiveness of currency futures and 
options, see [62, 63, 64, 65]. 
33. Although the dynamic portfolio insurance strategies do 
not work well during turbulent market condition, they are 
still the only available portfolio insurance strategies for 
Japan and Hong Kong. 
34. If the stock index futures contract is used in a 
portfolio insurance program which insures a portfolio of 
assets which are different from the index, greater basis 
risk is expected and thus higher cost of portfolio 
insurance. Frydman and Hill [49] have studied the cost of 
portfolio insurance over such program and concluded that 
the basis risk arising from using the S&P 500 futures to 
protect a well-diversified portfolio — the Windsor Fund 
was negligible. 
35. The Hang Seng Stock Index futures started trading on 
May 6, 1986 and the Nikkei 225 futures on September 3, 
1986. 
36. Garman and Klass [53] have developed a more efficient 
estimator by considering not only the open, high, low, and 
close, but the interrelationships between them as well. 
Parkinson [91] has also developed an estimator using only 
high, low and closing prices. His estimator is roughly 
five times as precise as the close-to-close estimator but 
it is less efficient than Garman and Klass'. See Appendix 
E for formulas. 
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37. Recently, Perry [94] has reported the existence of a 
complex short-term reversal phenomenon. Using daily 
returns to estimate monthly and quarterly variance tend to 
overestimate the true variance, while using daily returns 
to estimate weekly variance tends to underestimate it. 
However, no economic rationale for this reversal phenomenon 
is given. But, it provides evidence against the assumption 
of stationary and independent increments in the return¬ 
generating process of stocks, and is also evidence that a 
simple first-order autoregressive process is inadequate to 
describe the stochastic process which generates security 
returns. 
38. The major advantage of binomial option pricing model 
over the Black-Scholes model is that it incorporates the 
impact of early exercise due to the dividends. Since we 
need European options rather than American options, the 
impact of dividends on the option prices is not great even 
using the Black-Scholes model. 
39. See Ambachsteer [1] for a defense of the 60/40 asset 
mix for pension funds. 
40. The zero percentage rebalance interval represents 
rebalancing interval equal to the length of the data 
interval used, regardless of the change in the level of the 
index. For daily data, zero rebalancing means daily 
rebalancing. 
41. See Hang Sena Index Futures, May 1986 and Hong Kong 
Research: A Guide to Investment Procedures, June 1987, 
Vickers da Costa. 
42. Stoll and Whaley [118] also estimated the round trip 
transaction costs (2 commissions and 1 bid-ask spread) to 
be 0.5-0.75% of the underlying value (estimated from $10 
million ; commission rate=$0.07/share). This estimate is 
close to Kidder, Peabody's estimate. 
43. Kawaller, Koch and Koch [70] also found evidence of 
greater volatility in the S&P 500 futures marekts than in 
spot markets. 
44. Early experience of S&P 500 showed an undervaluation of 
5-6% of the index value in 1982 (Figlewski [45]). More 
recent study by Hill et al. [61] shows that on average the 
S&P 500 futures were overvalued by .536 S&P points or .32% 
of the index value for June 1983 through mid-August 1986. 
This average level of mispricing is within the range of 
differential trading costs between the spot and the futures 
market. The standard deviation of .905 is under one index 
point. 
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45. Finnerty and Park [46] used the minute by minute data 
on the MMI and found significant relation between the 
changes in the futures prices and the subsequent changes in 
the index. 
46. The costs are annualized by the number of calendar days 
of the protection horizon of the program. If a different 
number of days is used in the annualization, the conclusion 
of this study will not be affected significantly since it 
is only a linear transformation. 
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Appendix A 
Equivalency of a Fiduciary Call and a Protective Put 
in Portfolio Insurance 
This appendix, following Etzioni [38], shows how a put- 
protected position can be replicated with a position in a 
single risky asset and cash. By cash, we mean a riskless 
interest-bearing security. The dynamic strategy which 
creates portfolio insurance will be identical to the 
dynamic strategy which creates the equivalent call option. 
(1) From the put-call parity (Stoll [117]): 
Pt = Ct + (K * e-rT) - St (Al) 
i.e., put price equals the call price plus the difference 
between the present value of the exercise price and the 
price of the risky asset. 
where: P 
C 
K 
S 
r 
T 
e 
t 
put price; 
call price; 
exercise or strike price; 
price of the risky asset; 
riskless interest rate; 
protection horizon/time to expiration; 
2.71828; 
time period. 
(2) Rearranging: 
St + pt = Ct + (K * e rT) (A2) 
This equation shows that a portfolio of risky assets and 
put (i.e., an insured portfolio) can be replicated with a 
call and cash (riskless asset) position, otherwise known as 
a fiduciary (synthetic) call with the same time to maturity 
and the same strike price as the put. 
(3) From the Black/Scholes formula, the value of a call is 
given by: 
Ct = St * N(hi) - K * e~rT N(h2) (A3) 
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(4) Substituting the value of the call into the right-hand 
side of equation A2: 
st + pt = st * N(hi) + K * e_rT [1 - N(h2)] (A4) 
where: hi = [ln(Sf/K) + (r + 0.5 * SD2) * T]/(SD * T^•5) • 
h2 = hi - SD * t°•5; 
N = cumulative normal distribution function; 
N(hi) = delta/hedge ratio; 
SD = standard deviation; and 
In = natural logarithm. 
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Appendix B 
Contract Specifications 
Nikkei 225 Futures 
Exchange : Singapore International Monetary 
Exchange 
Contract Size : Yen 500 times the value of Nikkei 
Stock Average price. 
Trading Hours : Mon.- Fri. 8:00 A.M. - 2:15 P.M. 
Sat. 8:00 A.M. - 10:15 A.M. on 
1st, 4th (& 5th) of month. 
(Closed on Sundays and Singapore 
holidays). 
Contract Months : March, June, September, December, 
and the spot month. 
Minimum Price 
Fluctuation : Yen 5.0 (Yen 2500) 
Daily Price Limits : None 
Last Trading Day : Third Wednesday of delivery 
month. 
Settlement Day : Last trading day. 
Delivery : Cash settlement. Mark to the 
market made with Nikkei Stock 
Average closing price of the last 
trading day. 
Minimum Commission : First 10 contracts 3750 Yen 
over 11 contracts 2500 Yen 
Trading Method : Open Outcry. 
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Appendix C 
Contract Specifications 
Hang Seng Index Futures 
Exchange 
Contract Size 
Trading Hours 
Contract Months 
: Hong Kong Futures Exchange. 
: HK$50 times the Hang Seng Index. 
: 10:00 A.M. - 12:30 P.M., 2:30 P.M. 
- 3:30 P.M. from Monday to Friday 
(Wednesday from 10:00 A.M. --12:30 
P.M. ) 
: March, June, September and the Spot 
month. 
Minimum Price 
Fluctuation : One index point on the Hang Seng 
Index. 
Daily Price Limit 
Last Trading Day 
Settlement Day 
100 index point below or above the 
preceding day's settlement price, 
except as provided for by the Rule 
on Expanded Daily Limits. 
The last permitted day for trading 
shall be the second last trading 
day of the contract month. 
The last business day of the 
contract month. 
Delivery 
Minimum Commission 
Trading Method 
Cash settlement at index value 
declared by the Clearing House and 
shall be the Hang Seng Index as 
calculated by the Hang Seng Bank at 
the closing of the last trading 
day. 
HK$100 per trip for position 
carried overnight (HK$200 per round 
trip) . HK$60 per trip for day 
trading position (HK$120 per round 
trip). 
Open Outcry Trading System and 
Board Trading System. 
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Appendix D 
Contract Specifications 
S&P 500 Index Futures 
Exchange : Chicago Mercantile Exchange 
Trading Hours : 9:30 A.M. - 4:15 P.M. (Eastern) 
Contract Size : 500 times the S&P 500 index 
value. 
Minimum Price Change : .05 or $25.00 per contract unit 
Daily Price Change Limit: None. 
Contract Months : March, June, September and 
December. 
Last Trading Day : 3:00 P.M. (Central time) on the 
third Friday of the contract 
month. 
Settlement : Cash settlement. 
Delivery : Closing price of S&P 500 on the 
last day of trading. 
Trading Method : Open outcry medthod. 
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Appendix E 
Computational Procedure for Volatility Estimation 
Define: 
CLt = normalized closing price for period t; 
Ht = normalized high price for period t; 
Lt = normalized low price for period t; 
crt = Volatility estimate for period t; 
Close-to-close Estimator 
1 n 
<rt = [ — S(Rt-i - R) 2] 1/2 (A5) 
n i = l 
where = In (CLt/C^-i) 
1 n 
R = - 2 Rt-i 
n i=l 
Garman and Klass's High-low-close Estimator 
Let St2 = 0.5 In(Ht/Lt)2 - 0.383 In(Ct/Ct_i)2 
-0.019 (CLt*(Ht+Lt)-2*Ht*Lt) (A6) 
1 n 
and CTt = 
n i=l 
(A7) 
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Appendix F 
C = 
or 
C = 
where 
Binomial Option Pricing Formula 
n n! 
S (-) ( 1-p) 
j=a j!(n-j)! 
dn~j 
-) ] 
n n! 
- Kr-n [ S (-) P^(l-p)n~^] 
j=a j!(n-j)! 
(A8) 
S (§ [a; n, p' ] - K r n §6 [a; n, p] (A9) 
$[•] 
P 
P' 
a 
r 
p-q 
C 
S 
K 
n 
complementary binomial distribution 
function; 
(r-d)/(u-d); 
(u/r)p; 
the smallest non-negative integer greater 
than log (K/sdn) / log(u/d); 
one plus the riskless interest rate over 
one period; 
probabilities; 
call price; 
stock price; 
strike price; 
the number of iterations. 
If a > n, C=0. 
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